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Collusion to Control a Powerful Customer:
Amazon, E-Books, and Antitrust Policy
JOHN B. KIRKWOOD*
A federal judge recently held that Apple violated antitrust laws by
conspiring with leading publishers to raise e-book prices. While the
Justice Department characterized the case as routine, many commen-
tators argued it should not have been brought. In their view, the real
villain was Amazon, whose power and aggressive behavior
threatened to create a monopoly, reduce consumer choice, and
diminish the vitality of book publishing. In the face of such a power-
ful customer, the publishers should have been allowed to collude.
This article addresses that issue, in the e-books case and in general.
In the e-books case, collusion was almost certainly unwarranted.
Amazon appeared to be engaged in loss leading, not predatory pric-
ing, and fears of an eventual Amazon monopoly were largely
unfounded. Amazon’s buyer power, moreover, was not monopsony
power, which is frequently harmful, but countervailing power, which
can lead to lower consumer prices. There was no evidence it had
caused a reduction in the variety of new books.
In some circumstances, however, collusion to control a powerful cus-
tomer would be justified. This article identifies the most important
situations and develops a defense to the per se rule to protect them.
While the defense would rarely be satisfied, when it is, it would pro-
vide a remedy for anticompetitive buyer power that would otherwise
persist.
* Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law, and Senior Fellow, American
Antitrust Institute. I want to thank Roger Blair, Tom Campbell, Peter Carstensen, Margaret Chon,
Diane Dick, Albert Foer, Charlotte Garden, Christopher Sagers, Andrew Siegel, Maurice Stucke,
Nicholas Timchalk, and Heather Kirkwood for thoughtful comments and Kelly Kunsch for
excellent research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Few recent antitrust cases have generated as much interest—and
controversy—as “the e-books case.” It involved five leading publishers,
two of America’s best known high-tech firms (Apple and Amazon), and
a secret conspiracy, fueled by Steve Jobs himself, to force Amazon to
charge higher prices.1 According to the Justice Department, the publish-
1. Amazon’s growth, ambitions as a publisher, and deep discounting of e-books concerned
the publishers so much that, according to Brad Stone, they “believed their necks were being fitted
for the noose.” BRAD STONE, THE EVERYTHING STORE: JEFF BEZOS AND THE AGE OF AMAZON 280
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ers—encouraged and assisted by Apple—agreed to impose a new pric-
ing model on Amazon, which sharply increased the prices of new and
bestselling e-books.2 In the Justice Department’s telling, it was a routine
case: “Stripped of the glitz surrounding e-books and Apple, this is an
unremarkable and obvious price-fixing case appropriate for per se
condemnation.”3
But it was hardly routine in the eyes of many inside and outside the
industry. To the contrary, the response to the Justice Department’s first
round of proposed settlements, which allowed Amazon to resume its
price cutting on e-books, was intense and highly critical. The settlements
generated 868 public comments, and they were “overwhelmingly nega-
tive.”4 To be sure, many of them were submitted by Amazon’s competi-
tors, who may have been cloaking self-serving objections5 in public
interest terms.6 Other comments, however, could not be so easily swept
aside. For example, the Authors Guild, which represented individuals
who were not participants in the conspiracy and who would normally
(2013). Their response was “a sprawling, dramatic, multiyear imbroglio that would be laid bare in
. . . thousands of pages of legal documents and weeks of courtroom testimony . . . .” Id.
2. See infra Part II (summarizing the case).
3. Plaintiff’s Pretrial Memorandum of Law at 4, United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-cv-2826).
4. Opinion & Order at 19, United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(No. 12-cv-2826); see also id. (“More than 90 percent . . . opposed entry of the proposed Final
Judgment.”).
5. See Response of Plaintiff United States to Public Comments on the Proposed Final
Judgment at v, United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-cv-
2826) (“Critical comments generally were submitted by those who have an interest in seeing
consumers pay more for e-books, and hobbling retailers that might want to sell e-books at lower
prices.”).
6. Amazon’s competitors argued that the “agency model” of pricing, which the publishers
imposed on Amazon, benefited consumers because it encouraged other retailers to enter or invest
in the industry. See, e.g., Comments of Barnes & Noble, Inc. on the Proposed Final Judgment at
19, United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-cv-2826) (“This
result [releasing Amazon from the agency model] can only hurt e-book consumers. Improved
profitability has enabled distributors to invest substantially in the industry.”); American
Booksellers Association Comments on the Proposed Consent Decree at 2, United States v. Apple,
Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-cv-2826) (“Indie bookstores’ entrance into the
e-book market in late 2010 occurred only because the market was commercially viable as a
consequence of adoption by various publishers of the Agency Model in April 2010.”); Apple
Inc.’s Tunney Act Comment at 4, United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (No. 12-cv-2826) (“[T]he Proposed Judgment . . . will harm emerging eBook competitors
such as Apple, Barnes & Noble, and other retailers, including independent retailers. In the end, the
biggest loser will be the consumer . . . .”).
Part II explains the principal differences between the wholesale model and the agency model.
In brief, under the wholesale model, publishers charge a wholesale price, and retailers are free to
set the retail price. Under the agency model, the retail price of a book is determined by the
publisher. By imposing the agency model on Amazon, the conspiring publishers took control of
Amazon’s retail prices and increased them, which made it more profitable to enter or invest in the
e-books market.
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prefer competition in the distribution of their ideas, opposed entry of the
consent orders.7 Numerous commentators also criticized the govern-
ment’s action,8 including Professor Richard Epstein, who concluded that
“the betting here is that this law suit is a mistake.”9
What united the critics was concern with Amazon’s dominant posi-
tion as an e-book retailer and its aggressive tactics, particularly its
below-cost pricing as a seller and its hard bargaining as a buyer. Its low
prices could drive out other booksellers and ultimately increase retail
prices, while its buyer power could reduce gains to publishers and
authors, stunting the development of new titles. One common refrain
was that the government was focused on collusion by the publishers and
Apple when the real problem was the threat of an Amazon monopoly.10
Scott Turow, President of the Authors Guild, declared that “Amazon
was using e-book discounting to destroy bookselling, making it uneco-
nomic for physical bookstores to keep their doors open.”11 Michael
Shermer stated: “What this lawsuit probably will do . . . is return to
Amazon the power to monopolize the e-book market through predatory
pricing to the detriment of publishers, authors and, ultimately, read-
7. See Comments of The Authors Guild, Inc. at 1, United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-cv-2826).
8. See, e.g., David Carr, Book Publishing’s Real Nemesis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2012, at B1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/business/media/amazon-low-prices-disguise-a-
high-cost.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Michael Hiltzik, E-Book Ruling a Boon for Amazon, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2012, at B1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/12/business/la-fi-
hiltzik-20120912; Robert G. Hansen, The Apple E-Book Lawsuit and Amazon’s $9.99 Problem,
U.S. NEWS (Apr. 13, 2012, 12:12 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-
intelligence/2012/04/13/the-apple-e-book-lawsuit-and-amazons-999-problem; Steven Pearlstein,
Pick Your Monopoly: Apple or Amazon, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.washington
post.com/pick-your-monopoly-apple-or-amazon/2012/03/05/gIQA0kBB4R_story.html; Michael
Shermer, E-Book Overkill, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/16/
opinion/la-oe-shermer-apple-collusion-lawsuit-20120416.
9. Richard Epstein, Not Proven: The DOJ Suit Against Apple for eBook Pricing, RICOCHET
(Apr. 12, 2012, 12:33 PM), http://ricochet.com/main-feed/Not-Proven-The-DOJ-suit-Against-
Apple-for-eBook-Pricing. He elaborated: “Stated more generally, the usual cartel involves
restrictions that have few if any efficiency benefits. These agency transactions have both pluses
and minuses for consumers and for overall social welfare. It is a good rule of thumb to hold back
from public enforcement when the relative balance is unclear.” Id.
10. See, e.g., Juliette Garside, Ebook Bestsellers: Ebook Price War Between Apple and
Amazon Set to Be Exposed by EC Probe, OBSERVER, Dec. 18, 2011, at 36 (“‘The whole point of
the agency model is to prevent the emergence of monopolists like Amazon,’ says Benedict Evans,
a digital media expert at Enders Analysis. ‘What the publishers have done is stopped Amazon
from crushing the independent ebook retail sector.’”).
11. Letter from Scott Turow: Grim News, AUTHORS GUILD (Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.
authorsguild.org/advocacy/letter-from-scott-turow-grim-news. Turow argued that brick-and-
mortar bookstores provide an especially valuable service: “Marketing studies consistently show
that readers are far more adventurous in their choice of books when in a bookstore than when
shopping online. In bookstores, readers are open to trying new genres and new authors: it’s by far
the best way for new works to be discovered.” Id.
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ers.”12 David Carr asserted that Amazon was not only using below-cost
pricing to block entry into e-book retailing,13 but wielding its buyer
power to coerce better terms from publishers.14 Steven Pearlstein asked
the ultimate question: “[A]re monopolies so bad that we might want to
tolerate a little price-fixing by customers or suppliers in order to break
them? Could a little anti-competitive behavior actually be pro-
competitive?”15
This article addresses that question. It asks whether suppliers ought
to be allowed to collude to counteract the power of a large customer,
either in the circumstances of the e-books case or in other settings. The
issue is important. If the e-books case was a mistake, it would cast doubt
on the value of antitrust enforcement, suggesting that it seeks to preserve
“competition” at the expense of consumers.16 Likewise, if collusion to
control a powerful customer can never be permitted, no matter how ben-
eficial the consequences, it would raise questions about the very purpose
of antitrust law. Is the goal to preserve rivalry for its own sake, or is the
aim to make consumers, small suppliers, and the economy better off?
Finally, if, as a normative matter, collusion to control a powerful cus-
tomer should be allowed in some circumstances, antitrust law must
address the pragmatic issue: Can those circumstances be identified with
sufficient clarity to permit a workable and limited defense?17
Part II begins by summarizing the e-books case. This review leaves
little doubt that the defendant publishers conspired, with the enthusiastic
assistance of Apple, to impose a new pricing model on Amazon and
other retailers, causing the prices of popular e-books to rise substan-
tially. The question is whether that conspiracy was nevertheless desir-
able because it reduced Amazon’s power and aggressive behavior,
benefitting consumers in the long run.
12. Shermer, supra note 8. Senator Schumer argued that, if Amazon were not restrained, it
would devastate book publishing as well as book retailing. He asserted that “the suit could wipe
out the publishing industry as we know it,” and stated that “[t]he prospect that a single firm would
control access to books should give any reader pause.” Charles E. Schumer, Memo to DOJ: Drop
the Apple E-Books Suit, WALL ST. J., Jul. 18, 2012, at A15.
13. Carr, supra note 8 (“Amazon’s $9.99 subprofit price was a virtually impenetrable barrier
to entry for anyone who couldn’t afford to lose millions in order to gain market share.”).
14. Id. (“From the very beginning and with increasing regularity, Amazon has used its market
power to bully and dictate. It leaned on the Independent Publishers Group in recent months for
better terms and when those negotiations didn’t work out, Amazon simply removed the
company’s almost 5,000 e-books from its virtual shelves.”).
15. Pearlstein, supra note 8.
16. Cf. Chris Sagers, United States v. Apple and the Contemporary Legitimacy of Antitrust,
CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, June 2012 (1), at 2.
17. The issue is difficult because, as Sagers notes, “If there is one regulator that does not
share the public interest, it is a conspiracy of competitors.” Id. at 3. The pragmatic question, then,
is whether workable criteria can be identified for determining when collusion by self-interested
suppliers would promote consumer welfare.
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To lay the groundwork for that inquiry, Part III reviews the state of
the law and the scholarship on whether collusion is permissible if it off-
sets the power of a large customer. The case law is clear. Virtually all
cases apply a rule of per se illegality to hard-core collusion—agree-
ments among rivals that set prices or output but do not involve any pro-
ductive integration—even if the colluders are selling to or buying from a
firm with substantial power. Only one case has recognized the benefits
of offsetting power.18 Similarly, most scholars would not let firms col-
lude to exert countervailing power, concluding that a defense for such
behavior would do more harm than good.19 Several economists have
shown, however, that when small suppliers face a customer with monop-
sony power, they can protect themselves and benefit consumers by col-
luding to force the monopsonist to raise its input price and increase
output.20
Part IV evaluates whether this—or any other rationale—justified
the e-books conspiracy. The economists’ rationale did not because Ama-
zon did not possess monopsony power. While it did have considerable
countervailing power,21 there was no evidence that the exercise of this
power had harmed consumers or that it was likely to pose a much more
severe threat in the future.22 Amazon’s below-cost prices on many titles
were a concern, but these prices were probably not predatory, and even
if they had been, the proper response was not collusion but an antitrust
lawsuit. Neither Amazon’s power as a buyer nor its behavior as a seller
justified a conspiracy that imposed substantial price increases on
consumers.23
The larger issue, however, remains: Should suppliers be allowed to
collude in some circumstances to offset the power of a large customer?
Part V concludes that the answer is yes and proposes a limited defense
18. Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313, 317 (6th Cir. 1989).
19. See infra Part III.B (summarizing the views of Professors Hovenkamp, Elhauge, Baker,
Farrell, and Shapiro).
20. See infra Part III.B (describing the work of Professors Blair, Harrison, and Campbell).
Monopsony power is the classic form of buyer power. In theory, it is the mirror image of
monopoly power, and its exercise usually results in input prices—and output—that are below the
competitive level.
21. Countervailing power is the other type of buyer power. As explained below, it means the
power to offset the market power of a supplier. While the exertion of this power is often
procompetitive, it can be anticompetitive in many ways.
22. Amazon’s market share in e-books has dropped substantially and it now faces several
large competitors. Moreover, independent booksellers, an important channel for the presentation
of new titles, have been expanding recently. See infra Part IV.B.
23. Other analyses of the e-books conspiracy have also concluded that it should have been
challenged. See CHRIS SAGERS, APPLE, ANTITRUST, AND IRONY (forthcoming 2015); Nicholas
Timchalk, Note, E-Books, Collusion, and Antitrust Policy: Protecting a Dominant Firm at the
Cost of Innovation, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 161 (2014).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-1\MIA101.txt unknown Seq: 7  5-DEC-14 11:32
2014] COLLUSION TO CONTROL A POWERFUL CUSTOMER 7
to the per se rule to protect the most important instances of procompeti-
tive collusion. That defense would have three elements. First, colluding
suppliers would have to prove that their customer had buying power. In
addition, the suppliers would have to demonstrate that this power,
whether monopsony power or countervailing power, was legally
acquired, substantial, persistent, and durable.24 Second, the suppliers
would have to prove that their action was desirable. If the customer’s
power was monopsony power, no further proof would be required, for
counteracting monopsony power through the creation of supplier power
is ordinarily procompetitive.25 If the power was countervailing power,
however, the suppliers would have to furnish additional proof, because
the exercise of such power is often procompetitive and, when that is so,
it should not be offset. To show that the customer’s exercise of counter-
vailing power had been anticompetitive, the suppliers would have to
demonstrate that it had reduced their ability to innovate and that collu-
sion would lead to more innovation.26 Third, the suppliers would have to
prove that their collusion did not create downstream market power, for if
it did, it would normally harm consumers.
These requirements are demanding and would seldom be satisfied.
True monopsony power is unusual in the American economy,27 and sub-
stantial, persistent, and durable monopsony power is even rarer. While
countervailing power is more common,28 suppliers could not often prove
that the exercise of such power had an adverse effect on innovation.
Finally, upstream collusion frequently produces downstream market
power and, when that is so, suppliers could not collude. In short, Parts
IV and V affirm the traditional antitrust hostility to collusion, both by
rejecting the asserted justifications for it in the e-books case and by dem-
onstrating that the circumstances required to justify it in other cases are
highly restrictive. Nevertheless, there are some situations in which collu-
sion would be justified, and it appears possible to identify and protect
those cases through a limited and practical defense. When the necessary
24. Persistent and durable are similar terms, but in this framework persistence means that the
customer’s power had existed for a significant period of time, and durable means it is unlikely to
be eroded in the future.
25. In technical terms, creating a bilateral monopoly typically leads to higher output, even if
there is no guarantee it will produce the efficient level. See infra Parts III & V.
26. While countervailing power can harm competition in other ways, it is prudent to limit the
defense, at least initially, to instances in which such power retards innovation, the most important
dimension of competition. Part V suggests practical criteria for determining whether the exercise
of countervailing power had reduced innovation and whether collusion would increase it.
27. See John B. Kirkwood, Powerful Buyers and Merger Enforcement, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1485,
1496–97 (2012).
28. See id. at 1502–05.
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facts are established, collusion to control a powerful customer ought to
be permitted.
II. THE E-BOOKS CONSPIRACY
It is easy to characterize the e-books conspiracy as anticompetitive.
In the simple version of the case, Amazon was a disruptive force that the
publishers took steps to suppress. The case arose because Amazon
greatly expanded a new market by introducing a popular e-reader and
selling e-books at very low prices. Those prices aroused the ire of book
publishers because they threatened the publishers’ traditional methods of
pricing and distribution. As a result, the publishers joined forces with
Apple, a prospective entrant into the new market, to force Amazon to
raise its prices, increasing Apple’s profits and helping the publishers
protect the much higher prices they charged on new hardcover books. In
this narrative, the conspirators used a classic method of exclusion—rais-
ing rivals’ costs29—a method condemned in another high profile case
involving a large customer combatting a new and disruptive method of
distribution.30
This rendition of the e-books conspiracy, however, tells only part of
the story. It ignores the threats that Amazon itself may have posed to
competition, consumers, and the publishing industry. Part IV evaluates
whether those threats justified the publishers’ and Apple’s collusion.
This Part summarizes and analyzes the conspiracy itself, based on the
Justice Department’s complaint,31 the district court’s opinions,32 and
other information.
A. The $9.99 Problem
Under any version of the case, Amazon was a pioneer. It was the
first firm to develop a widely used e-reader, introducing the Kindle and
its associated e-book store in November of 2007.33 Moreover, one of its
“most successful marketing strategies was to lower substantially the
29. For the leading exposition, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop,
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209,
230–42 (1986).
30. See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 2000).
31. Complaint, United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-
cv-2826).
32. United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Opinion & Order,
supra note 4.
33. The Kindle’s “crucial improvement over previous e-readers” was its ability to “store as
many as two hundred books . . . .” George Packer, Cheap Words: Amazon is Good for Customers.
But is it Good for Books?, NEW YORKER (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2014/02/17/140217fa_fact_packer?currentPage=all.
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price of newly released and bestselling e-books to $9.99.”34 As a result,
e-book sales exploded, achieving triple-digit sales growth each subse-
quent year.35 At the same time, the ballooning sales of e-books and
Amazon’s very low price upset many of the leading book publishers.
The publishers saw Amazon’s $9.99 price as a threat to their profits
and traditional business model for four main reasons. First, they believed
that “the price point was eating into sales of hardcover print books,
which were often priced at thirty dollars or higher.”36 Second, “if $9.99
solidified as the consumers’ expected retail price for e-books,” the pub-
lishers worried that “Amazon and other retailers would demand that
publishers lower their wholesale prices, further compressing publisher
profit margins.”37 Third, “the rapid growth in e-books” stimulated by
that price “would threaten the survival of brick-and-mortar bookstores
(the Publisher Defendants’ preferred distributors) . . . .”38 Finally, there
was a more existential threat: “The Publisher Defendants were espe-
cially concerned that Amazon was well positioned to enter the digital
publishing business and thereby supplant publishers as intermediaries
between authors and consumers.”39
The $9.99 price was particularly jarring to the publishers—and to
many others as well—because it was frequently below Amazon’s
wholesale cost. Since Amazon also sold many titles at a profit, the gov-
ernment characterized its conduct as loss leading rather than predation:
Some of those $9.99 e-books were sold below Amazon’s wholesale
cost, especially once publishers began raising their digital list prices
in late 2008 and early 2009. However, the $9.99 loss leaders repre-
sented a relatively small portion of Amazon’s e-book sales, and Ama-
zon generally realized positive margins on the balance of its e-book
sales.40
But even if the $9.99 price was not truly predatory, the Publisher
Defendants (Hachette, HarperCollins, Macmillan, Penguin, and Simon
& Schuster) remained unhappy with it and met repeatedly to develop a
response.41
34. Complaint, supra note 31, ¶ 2.
35. Id. ¶ 27.
36. Opinion & Order, supra note 4, at 5.
37. Complaint, supra note 31, ¶ 33.
38. Opinion & Order, supra note 4, at 5–6.
39. Complaint, supra note 31, ¶ 34.
40. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Memorandum of Law, supra note 3, at 6–7.
41. These meetings, conducted in private and without counsel present, were highly suggestive
of an illicit conspiracy. See Complaint, supra note 31, ¶ 39:
Starting no later than September of 2008 and continuing for at least one year, the
Publisher Defendants’ CEOs (at times joined by one non-defendant publisher’s
CEO) met privately as a group approximately once per quarter. These meetings took
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B. Apple’s Entry and Proposed Terms
Fortunately for the publishers, Apple was about to launch its latest
new product, the iPad, and wanted to sell e-books on it. Moreover,
Apple favored the agency model—under which publishers would set the
retail prices of e-books and retailers would receive a commission for
selling them—because it would provide Apple with a guaranteed profit
margin.42 In addition, as explained below, both Apple’s margin and the
publishers’ revenues would be higher if Amazon’s retail prices could be
raised. As the Justice Department maintained, therefore, “Apple’s entry
into the e-book business provided a perfect opportunity for collective
action to implement the agency model and use it to raise retail e-book
prices.”43
Apple soon circulated a proposed e-book distribution agreement to
the leading publishers that embodied the agency model. It contained four
key terms:44 (1) retail pricing authority would be held by the publisher;
(2) the publisher must “lower the retail price of each e-book in Apple’s
iBookstore to match the lowest price offered by any other retailer,”45
whether or not that retailer was on the agency model; (3) “Apple would
receive a 30 percent commission for each e-book sale;”46 and (4) each
publisher “would have identical pricing tiers for e-books sold through
Apple’s iBookstore.”47
The Justice Department asserted that the “purpose of these provi-
sions was to work in concert to enforce the Defendants’ agreement to
raise and stabilize retail e-book prices.”48 Of course, the most favored
nations clause (provision (2)) would actually prevent prices from rising
if Amazon’s $9.99 price was allowed to continue. Under that clause, the
publishers would have to lower their prices in the iBookstore to match
place in private dining rooms of upscale Manhattan restaurants and were used to
discuss confidential business and competitive matters, including Amazon’s e-book
retailing practices. No legal counsel was present at any of these meetings.
See also United States v. Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (making essentially
identical findings of fact). The Publisher Defendants also frequently communicated with each
other by telephone. Complaint, supra note 31, ¶ 72.
42. See Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 659 (“Apple settled on an agency model with a 30%
commission, the same commission it was using in its App Store. Agency . . . ensured that Apple
would make a profit from every e-book sale in its iBookstore . . . .”); Complaint, supra note 31, ¶
6 (noting that in his basic pitch to the publishers, Steve Jobs, Apple’s then-CEO, stressed the
commission Apple would receive: “We’ll go to [an] agency model, where you set the price, and
we get our 30% . . . .”).
43. Complaint, supra note 31, ¶ 51.
44. See id. ¶¶ 62–65.
45. Id. ¶ 65.
46. Id. ¶ 63.
47. Id.
48. Id. ¶ 66.
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Amazon. If they did that, though, the consequence would be less reve-
nues for both themselves and Apple, since under the agency model the
revenues of both retailer and publisher are a function of the retail price.49
In short, while the ostensible purpose of the most favored nations clause
was to protect Apple from being undercut by Amazon’s pricing, in real-
ity it created a financial incentive to raise Amazon’s prices.50
In addition, Apple’s executives told the publishers that they wanted
to see the retail price of a new or bestselling e-book increased from
$9.99 to $12.99 or $14.99. In a remarkably explicit email, Steve Jobs
urged one of the publishers: “Throw in with Apple and see if we can all
make a go of this to create a real mainstream e-books market at $12.99
and $14.99.”51 Similarly, Judge Cote found: “At their very first meetings
in mid-December 2009, the Publishers conveyed to Apple their abhor-
rence of Amazon’s pricing, and Apple assured the Publishers it was will-
ing to work with them to raise those prices, suggesting prices such as
$12.99 and $14.99.”52 In order to achieve this objective, however, the
agency model had to be applied to Amazon.
C. The Publishers’ Move Against Amazon
1. NEED FOR JOINT ACTION
The publishers realized that if they wanted to impose the agency
model on Amazon, they had to act together. If they did not—if one pub-
49. Under provision (3), Apple would receive a commission of thirty percent of the retail
price of each sale. The publisher would receive seventy percent. A lower retail price would thus
mean that both Apple and the publisher would make less money.
50. Judge Cote agreed, describing the incentive as a “severe financial penalty” the publishers
would face if they did not require Amazon to increase its prices. See United States v. Apple, 952
F. Supp. 2d 638, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that the most favored nations clause “imposed a
severe financial penalty upon the Publisher Defendants if they did not force Amazon and other
retailers similarly to change their business models and cede control over e-book pricing to the
Publishers”); see also id. at 665 (stating that the most favored nations clause “literally stiffened
the spines of the Publisher Defendants to ensure that they would demand new terms from
Amazon.”). While provision (2) was not literally a most favored nations clause, many people,
including Judge Cote, called it that because its function was to make sure that Apple was not
placed at a disadvantage relative to its competitors.
51. Complaint, supra note 31, ¶ 71. Likewise, Jobs reportedly told his biographer that his
fundamental pitch to the publishers was: “We’ll go to [an] agency model, where you set the price,
and we get our 30%, and yes, the customer pays a little more, but that’s what you want anyway.”
Id. ¶ 6.
52. See Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 647. Judge Cote acknowledged that the “record is equivocal
on whether Apple itself desired higher e-book prices than those offered at Amazon.” Id. at 706
n.68. But she added: “It is unequivocal though that Apple embraced higher prices so convincingly
that the Publishers believed that Apple was content with, and even wanted, higher prices . . . .” Id.
There is no doubt about the publishers’ intent. They were so interested in eliminating
Amazon’s $9.99 price that they were willing to give up revenues in order to achieve it. As
explained below, under the agency model proposed by Apple, the publishers would make less
money from the sale of e-books, even if retail prices rose to $14.99.
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lisher tried to impose the model by itself—Amazon would almost cer-
tainly retaliate, curtailing or eliminating its orders from that publisher
and making its strategy unprofitable.53 On the other hand, if the publish-
ers collaborated, Amazon would have to capitulate, since “collectively
the Publisher Defendants accounted for nearly half of Amazon’s e-book
revenues.”54 As a result, Judge Cote declared, “from the publishers’ per-
spective, the switch to the agency model had the hallmarks of a classic
collective action problem.”55
Central to this conclusion was Amazon’s dominant position in book
retailing, which Apple portrayed in vivid terms:
Amazon is the most powerful force in books. It accounts for 60% of
eBook sales today. It also is the dominant retailer of physical books
online with an estimated 70% share. It is estimated that Amazon will
account for 50% of all book sales in 2012. That makes Amazon an
essential partner to any publisher, and, as a result, it has significant
leverage to dictate terms in its negotiations. And when publishers
resist, Amazon makes them pay.56
To ensure the necessary unanimity in the face of such a powerful cus-
tomer, Apple’s chief negotiator, Eddy Cue, told the five publishers that
it “‘would only [launch the iBookstore] if we got them all.’”57 Cue
explained: “‘I just wanted to assure [the publishers] that they weren’t
going to be alone, so that I would take the fear away of the Amazon
retribution that they were all afraid of.’”58
2. MACMILLAN FOLLOWED BY THE OTHER FOUR
Accordingly, in early 2010, all five publisher defendants informed
Amazon that they intended to move to the agency model.59 Once their
agreements with Apple were signed, however, no publisher wanted to be
the first to tell Amazon it had to accept the model. Ultimately, Macmil-
lan made the first move.60 Its CEO flew to Seattle and in a short, tense
53. See id. at 647.
54. Complaint, supra note 31, ¶ 46.
55. In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., 859 F. Supp. 2d 671, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
56. Apple Inc.’s Tunney Act Comment, supra note 6, at 7–8. Apple’s comment was written
two years after the introduction of agency pricing. When the publishers were contemplating this
move, Amazon’s share of e-book sales was ninety percent. See Opinion & Order, supra note 4, at
35.
57. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Memorandum of Law, supra note 3, at 30 n.129.
58. Id. at 31 n.131.
59. United States v. Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“In separate
conversations on January 20 and over the next few days, the Publisher Defendants all told
Amazon that they wanted to change to an agency distribution model with Amazon.”).
60. Joint Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees United States and Plaintiff-States (Page Proof) at 27,
United States v. Apple Inc., 13-3741 (L) (2d Cir. May 27, 2014) (“Macmillan was the first
publisher to give Amazon an ultimatum.”); see also Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 679 (noting that
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meeting told Amazon that Macmillan would switch to the agency model
and that, if Amazon did not agree, it would withhold the e-book versions
of new hardcover titles from Amazon until seven months after it
released the print versions.61
Since Macmillan had confronted Amazon by itself, Amazon retali-
ated as expected, removing the “buy buttons” from all of Macmillan’s
titles, its print books as well as its e-books.62 This demonstration of
Amazon’s buyer power was short-lived, however; within two days,
Amazon restored the buy buttons on all Macmillan titles.63 The dramatic
switch occurred because Amazon learned that four of the other leading
publishers would also insist on agency terms, and it could not refuse to
deal with all five.64 Thus, by the time Apple opened the iBookstore in
April 2010, Amazon had agreed with all five publishers to accept the
agency model.65 Since Barnes & Noble had also moved to agency,66 this
meant that every one of the nation’s major book retailers had surren-
dered control over the retail pricing of e-books.
D. Impact on Prices and Amazon’s Market Share
The result was an immediate and sharp increase in the retail prices
of many e-books.67 Instead of selling them at $9.99, Amazon was fre-
quently charging $12.99 or $14.99, an increase of thirty or fifty per-
cent.68 Overall, the district court found that the increase was substantial,
and for New York Times (“NYT”) bestsellers it exceeded forty percent.69
only “Macmillan, the smallest of the five Publishers, did the honorable thing and delivered its
message in person.”).
61. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Memorandum of Law, supra note 3, at 20–21.
62. Motoko Rich & Brad Stone, Publisher Wins Fight on E-Books, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010,
at B1 (“Amazon shocked the publishing world late last week by removing direct access to the
Kindle editions as well as printed books from Macmillan . . . .”).
63. Complaint, supra note 31, ¶ 84 (“Just two days after it stopped selling Macmillan titles,
Amazon capitulated and publicly announced that it had no choice but to accept the agency
model . . . .”); see also Rich & Stone, supra note 62.
64. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Memorandum of Law, supra note 3, at 21 (“Amazon capitulated once it
understood that all five Publisher Defendants had committed themselves to the agency model
across all their retailers.”); id. at 21 n.98 (citing the testimony of Russell Grandinetti, an Amazon
executive, that “it had been made clear to us by Simon, HarperCollins, Macmillan, Hachette and
Penguin that they were all going to require us to move to agency . . . . Much as we disagreed with
the publishers’ decision . . . we could not have new titles from five of our biggest publishers
unavailable to our customers, so we really had no choice but to negotiate” agency terms).
65. See Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Memorandum of Law, supra note 3, at 20 (noting that virtually all
e-book retailers had made agency agreements with the publishers by the time “the iBookstore
became publicly accessible on April 3, 2010”).
66. Id. (“Some retailers, such as Barnes & Noble, readily accepted agency terms . . . .”).
67. Id. (“Almost overnight [prices increased on] the vast majority of newly released and
bestselling e-books . . . .”).
68. See id.
69. United States v. Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The increases at
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Other e-book retailers also raised prices: “After defendants’ coordinated
switch to agency pricing, a consumer could not find Publisher Defen-
dants’ newly released and bestselling e-books for $9.99 at any
retailer.”70 As the Justice Department put it, the conspirators had
achieved their goal. They had “eliminated the ‘wretched $9.99 price’
that so attracted the reading public and so infuriated publishers . . . .”71
At the same time, though, the structure of the e-book retail market
became less concentrated. The higher margins provided by the agency
model facilitated Apple’s entry and made it easier for Barnes & Noble,
which had introduced the Nook in 2009,72 to expand. The growth of
these two rivals—and others like Google and Sony73—caused Amazon’s
market share to drop sharply. According to the district court, “it is undis-
puted that Amazon’s market share in e-books decreased from 90 to 60
percent in the two years following the introduction of agency pricing.”74
This decline in Amazon’s dominance, however, cannot automati-
cally be described as procompetitive. If Amazon’s preeminence had
been due solely to superior performance—the introduction of a popular
e-reader and low, but non-predatory e-book prices—a conspiracy that
restricted this performance (by forcing Amazon to charge higher prices)
would not enhance competition. To the contrary, it would discourage
Amazon—and other firms—from engaging in such desirable perfor-
mance in the future, and it would cause consumers to pay higher prices,
both in the short run and the long term. While the conspiracy would
encourage new entry, that entry could not be justified if the only reason
it occurred was artificially elevated prices.75
Amazon within roughly two weeks of moving to agency amounted to an average per unit e-book
retail price increase of 14.2% for their New Releases, 42.7% for their NYT Bestsellers, and 18.6%
across all of the Publisher Defendants’ e-books.”).
70. Opinion & Order, supra note 4, at 33.
71. Reply Memorandum in Support of the United States’ Motion for Entry of Final Judgment
at 2, United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-cv-2826).
72. See Julie Bosman, Holiday Sales Slide 60% at Struggling Barnes & Noble Nook Unit,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2014, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/business/
media/barnes-noble-reports-steep-drop-in-holiday-sales.html.
73. See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
74. Opinion & Order, supra note 4, at 35.
75. Such entry might still have some benefits. As Geoffrey Manne notes, it could “increas[e]
e-book retail competition and promot[e] innovation among e-book readers . . . .” Geoffrey Manne,
How Apple Can Defeat the DOJ’s E-Book Antitrust Suit, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2012, 5:30 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2012/04/12/how-apple-can-defeat-the-dojs-e-book-antitrust-suit.
But if there were no market failure—no reason why the e-books market would not generate entry
if consumers valued it more than it cost—then the benefits of the entry would be outweighed by
the artificially higher retail prices that induced it.
Moreover, Apple claims it would have entered anyway. So long as the publishers adopted an
agency model—and Apple got its thirty percent commission—entry would have been profitable,
whether or not the publishers raised retail prices. See Appellant Apple Inc.’s Opening Brief (Page
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Several industry participants claimed that the switch to agency pric-
ing led to a reduction in e-book prices. Barnes & Noble, the American
Booksellers Association, Penguin, and others submitted data purporting
to show this.76 But economic experts retained by the Justice Department
produced regression analyses that found the opposite,77 and it is hard to
see why the publishers’ adoption of agency—and Amazon’s reluctant
acceptance of it—would have caused prices to fall. If the publishers had
wanted lower retail prices, they could have reduced their wholesale
prices without shifting to agency. By eliminating Amazon’s ability to
sell e-books for $9.99, the conspiracy would have tended to raise retail
prices, not lower them. Thus, if retail e-book prices did fall, on average,
after the widespread adoption of agency, that was likely not due to the
conspiracy, but rather to broader industry trends, such as the rising pop-
ularity of e-books, the growth in the number of e-titles, and the conse-
quent realization of economies of scale and scope.78 In fact, according to
the district court, average e-book prices did not fall following the shift to
agency.79
E. Random House’s Position and Its Implications
When the five publishers adopted agency pricing and imposed it on
Amazon, they created a profit opportunity for Random House, the
Proof) at 22, United States v. Apple Inc., No. 13-3741 (L) (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 2014) (“Apple sought
to enter a market dominated by a single retailer and needed to ensure that it could be competitive
and profitable. . . . [T]o avoid launching a lossmaking business, . . . it . . . insisted on its 30%
commission, with which it knew it could be profitable at any price point.”). Of course, Apple may
have been posturing when it made this claim. But its position is consistent with the fact that other
firms entered the e-books market while Amazon was still charging $9.99, indicating that they, too,
did not need higher prices to enter. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
76. Opinion & Order, supra note 4, at 31.
77. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Memorandum of Law, supra note 3, at 36 (stating that Professor
Gilbert’s analysis showed that “ten months after the agency contracts took effect, Publisher
Defendants’ e-book titles sold on Amazon were, on average, 23.9% higher than their pre-agency
prices. Professor Ashenfelter’s regression analysis similarly finds a 24.6% increase . . . over the
same period”).
78. See Apple Inc.’s Pre-Trial Memorandum of Law at 5, United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-cv-2826) (describing a quadrupling of the number of e-
titles available between April 2010 and May 2013); see id. at 16 (indicating that the number of e-
books purchased from seven of the leading retailers increased more than 447% from the second
quarter of 2010 to the first quarter of 2012).
79. Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 685:
Apple argued at trial that the opening of the iBookstore actually led to an overall
decline in trade e-book prices during the two-year period that followed that event.
Its evidence was not persuasive. Apple’s experts did not present any analysis that
attempted to control for the many changes that the e-book market was experiencing
during these early years of its growth . . . . The analysis presented by the Plaintiffs’
experts as well as common sense lead invariably to a finding that the actions taken
by Apple and the Publisher Defendants led to an increase in the price of e-books.
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nation’s largest trade book publisher.80 Random House could undercut
the other publishers and increase its profits and market share by
allowing Amazon to continue to sell its e-books for $9.99 while charg-
ing more for the other publishers’ e-books. This strategy, normally avail-
able to any firm that wants to cheat on colluding rivals, was especially
appealing in this case. Under the agency terms proposed by Apple and
adopted by the five publishers, the publishers made less money, even
after they raised prices, than they made under the wholesale model.
Under that model, it was common for a large publisher like Penguin to
charge a wholesale price of roughly $13.00 for the e-book version of a
new hardcover title. While Amazon would incur a loss if it resold the e-
book for $9.99, Penguin would still receive $13.00. Under the agency
model, in contrast, Amazon was forced to charge a higher retail price,
say $12.99, but because the model provided a commission of thirty per-
cent,81 the per unit revenue Penguin would receive would be just
$9.09.82 Worse, because the agency model resulted in higher retail
prices, the number of units sold fell, relative to what they would have
been under the wholesale model.83 In short, the move to agency meant
that the five publishers were receiving less revenue per unit and selling
fewer units. As a result, Random House could make considerably more
money by retaining the wholesale model. It would receive a higher price
on each e-book it sold, and it would sell more of them. Moreover,
because Amazon would continue to charge $9.99 for popular Random
House e-books while the prices of other publishers’ titles rose, Random
House would gain even greater market share.
Initially, Random House chose to take advantage of this profit
opportunity.84 It refused to participate in the alleged conspiracy, main-
tained its wholesale prices, and allowed Amazon to continue to discount
them heavily. The effect on its sales and the sales of the other five pub-
lishers was as expected. During the first week of agency pricing, “Ama-
zon e-book sales for non-agency publisher Random House increased
10%, while Publisher Defendants’ sales declined 20% overall . . . .”85
The strategy was so successful that an Amazon executive complimented
Random House on it. She noted “how well served Random House was
80. Id. at 673 (noting that Random House is “the largest Publisher”).
81. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
82. That is, $12.99 less thirty percent or, equivalently, seventy percent of $12.99.
83. The total number of e-books sold rose markedly during this period. See supra note 78. But
the higher retail prices meant that the expansion would have been even greater had Amazon been
able to continue charging $9.99.
84. See Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 677 (stating that Random House “believed it ‘would be
better off economically sticking with the wholesale model.’”).
85. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Memorandum of Law, supra note 3, at 37; see also Apple, 952 F. Supp.
2d at 686 (noting that Random House’s sales and market share increased).
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by essentially cheating on the conspiracy by sticking with the higher
wholesale prices and lower retail prices of the traditional wholesale
model . . . .”86 Eventually, however, Random House fell into line. When
Apple introduced a new version of the iPad in 2011, Random House
moved to the agency model.87 It is unclear why this change made sense.
True, Apple had not been stocking Random House titles in the iBook-
store, and the switch to agency rectified this problem, but Random
House presumably stood to gain much more by allowing Amazon, the
much larger e-book retailer,88 to market its titles at a substantially lower
price.89
While Random House’s switch to agency is puzzling, the greater
puzzle is the behavior of the five major publishers. According to the
government’s theory and a great deal of supporting evidence, the five
conspired to adopt the agency model and impose it on Amazon, even
though the consequence was that their profits fell—they sold fewer e-
books and received less money for each one.90 Several observers noted
the anomaly. A Random House executive stated: “I guess what we never
figured in was the idea that five publishers would band together and
insist on receiving worse terms.”91 Barnes & Noble pointed out the same
problem: “[T]he alleged conspiracy was intended to reduce publisher
profits.”92 An Amazon executive agreed; he could not understand why
Penguin was “working so hard to have [Amazon send it] less money on
each sale while at the same time, reducing total sales and frustrating
86. Plaintiffs’ Response to Apple’s Pretrial Memorandum of Law at 18 n.89, United States v.
Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-cv-2826) (summarizing email from an
Amazon executive to a Random House executive).
87. See Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Memorandum of Law, supra note 3, at 22 (noting that Random
House switched “exclusively to agency distribution of e-books as of March 1, 2011”); Turow,
supra note 11 (stating that Random House “took the leap with the launch of the iPad 2”).
88. See Garside, supra note 10 (reporting that Apple’s share of e-book sales in the U.S. was at
best less than half of Amazon’s share, which was then about sixty percent).
89. To be sure, Apple threatened Random House with certain consequences if it did not
accept agency. See Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Memorandum of Law, supra note 3, at 22 (“Apple pressured
Random House to switch to agency by, inter alia, threatening to block Random House e-books
that were sold as standalone apps from appearing in its App Store . . . .”); see also id. at 22 n.100
(“Additionally, Mr. Jobs threatened that Random House might not receive full support from Apple
personnel if it eventually put its e-books into the iBookstore at a later date.”). But these
consequences seem small compared to the costs of giving up both higher wholesale pricing and
lower retail pricing.
90. Apple, in contrast, benefited directly from the agency model it proposed, since the result
was higher retail prices and (effectively) lower wholesale prices (due to the generous commission
Apple received).
91. See Plaintiffs’ Response to Apple’s Pretrial Memorandum of Law, supra note 86, at 18
n.89.
92. Comments of Barnes & Noble, Inc. on the Proposed Final Judgment at 13, United States
v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-cv-2826).
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us.”93
Perhaps the publishers had a procompetitive motivation. They may
have felt, as so many commentators did, that Amazon’s dominant posi-
tion and aggressive behavior was harmful to their long-run interests and
had to be controlled—even if that required lower profits in the short
term. By avoiding an Amazon monopoly, the publishers could enhance
their long-term competitiveness by making the purchase of books more
attractive relative to other uses of consumers’ income and thereby
improve the long-run welfare of consumers as well as their own profits.
The reason the alleged conspiracy reduced publisher profits, in short,
was that it was an investment—an investment that would ultimately
redound to their benefit.
There are two objections to this theory. One, the subject of Part IV,
is that Amazon’s power and behavior did not in fact justify collusion to
counteract it. Instead, the publishers overestimated the threat that Ama-
zon posed and adopted a remedy that directly harmed consumers. The
second objection is that the publishers’ long-run goal was not
procompetitive. Their ultimate aim was not to benefit consumers but to
preserve the higher prices they charged for hardcover books. The adop-
tion of agency was an investment, but the return would come not from
making the purchase of books more attractive to consumers. Instead, it
would come from preserving the ability to sell a large category of those
books at higher prices.94
Of course, even if the publishers’ ultimate goal had been procom-
petitive, it would have been very difficult, probably impossible, to
defend their collusion under existing case law. As Part III also explains,
however, several economists have shown that collusion to offset the
classic type of buyer power—monopsony power—can be beneficial.
Their work provides the foundation for the more comprehensive and
detailed defense developed in Part V.
III. BUYER POWER AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR COLLUSION
Since the Supreme Court declared price fixing to be per se illegal,95
it has never allowed sellers to collude to offset the power of a large
buyer. To be sure, the Court has never confronted the question precisely.
It has never faced a case in which a group of small, competitive sellers
93. Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 678 n.46 (quoting Russell Grandinetti); see also id. at 692 (“The
economics of the Agreements [with Apple] were, simply put, ‘terrible’ for the Publishers.”).
94. Judge Cote found that the publishers saw their long-term interest—“their ultimate goal”—
as “the protection of book value.” Id. More specifically: “The Publisher Defendants wanted to
shift their industry to higher e-book prices to protect the prices of their physical books and the
brick and mortar stores that sold those physical books.” Id. at 665.
95. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
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alleged that their sole customer had so much buying power that, unless
the sellers joined together, it would depress price and output below the
competitive level, exploiting them and reducing efficiency. But as Part
III.A explains, the Court has repeatedly rejected claims that collusion
was necessary to correct other market problems, making it highly
unlikely that the Court would permit suppliers to collude because they
faced a monopsonist. Moreover, in one decision, where lawyers for indi-
gent criminal defendants organized a boycott to force the local govern-
ment—the sole purchaser of these services—to pay them more, the
Court came very close to rejecting this defense.96 Only one case stands
as an exception to this pattern: a Sixth Circuit decision holding that col-
lusion by buyers might be justified if it reduced the market power of
suppliers and the benefits were passed on to consumers.97
As Part III.B shows, most scholars agree with the state of the law,
not because they think that collusion can never benefit consumers, but
because they believe it is better policy to reject the justification in all
cases. In essence, these scholars reason that if a buyer has too much
power, antitrust law ought to challenge that power directly and, if it
cannot, it ought to wait for market forces to erode it. Where market
forces are unlikely to do so, it is better to allow the power to continue
than to permit sellers to collude to offset it because (a) collusion will
often make things worse and (b) it is hard to tell when that is not so. As
Part III.B also notes, however, this view is not unanimous. Several
scholars believe that suppliers ought to be allowed to combine to offset
buyer power because, in certain circumstances, it would increase output,
prevent exploitation of the suppliers, and benefit consumers. If those
circumstances could be identified at a reasonable cost, an exception
from the per se rule would advance the purposes of antitrust law. Collu-
sion in those settings would enhance downstream competition and raise
consumer welfare, supplier welfare, and total welfare.
To be sure, such collusion would interfere with the competitive
process upstream if that process is defined solely in terms of rivalry. But
it would not constitute anticompetitive conduct under a more accurate
definition. As I have argued elsewhere, anticompetitive conduct is best
defined as “conduct that creates market power, transfers wealth from
consumers to producers, and fails to provide consumers with compensat-
ing benefits.”98 Under that definition, collusion that qualifies for the
96. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 436 (1990).
97. See Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313, 316–317 (6th
Cir. 1989).
98. See John B. Kirkwood, The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small
Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2429 (2013). In a buy-side
case, the definition of anticompetitive conduct would be similar: Conduct that creates monopsony
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defense set forth in Part V would not be anticompetitive. To the con-
trary, it would provide consumers with compensating benefits: it would
increase output, often lower prices, and, in some cases, enhance
innovation.
A. Case Law
The landmark case in this area is United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co.,99 where Justice Douglas, exasperated at past attempts to justify
price-fixing conspiracies, declared that Congress had not intended to
accept any justifications at all:
Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not
particular price-fixing schemes are wise or unwise, healthy or
destructive. It has not permitted the age-old cry of ruinous competi-
tion and competitive evils to be a defense to price-fixing conspira-
cies. It has no more allowed genuine or fancied competitive abuses as
a legal justification for such schemes than it has the good intentions
of the members of the combination.100
The Court declared that agreements to fix prices were per se illegal101
and that no defense of reasonableness would be accepted.102 This appar-
ently inflexible ban, the most important in antitrust law,103 persists to
this day.104 Thus, more recent decisions have rejected attempts to justify
collusion on the ground that it would promote social values, like public
safety, or put an end to illegal behavior. For example, in National Soci-
power, transfers wealth from suppliers to buyers, and fails to provide suppliers with compensating
benefits. See id.
99. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
100. Id. at 221–22.
101. Id. at 223.
102. Id. at 226 n.59.
103. Hard-core price fixing is the only antitrust offense that is commonly prosecuted
criminally. The Supreme Court has characterized collusion as the “supreme evil of antitrust.”
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004). And
Professor Hovenkamp, co-author of the leading antitrust treatise, has called price fixing “kind of
the first-degree murder of antitrust violations.” Thomas Catan, Critics of E-Books Lawsuit Miss
the Mark, Experts Say, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2012, 2:36 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702303978104577359741232993860.
This prominence may not be entirely warranted. Several scholars have argued that antitrust’s
focus on hard-core collusion has diverted needed attention from monopolization and other forms
of exclusionary conduct. See Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?,
2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 503–04 (2009) (asserting that the Court’s antitrust hierarchy is not
supported); see also Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST
L.J. 527 (2013) (arguing that anticompetitive exclusion could be more problematic than
collusion).
104. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 893 (2007) (“A
horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers or competing retailers that decreases output or
reduces competition in order to increase price is, and ought to be, per se unlawful.”).
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ety of Professional Engineers v. United States,105 the defendant claimed
that competitive bidding would result in engineering work that was
“dangerous to the public health, safety, and welfare.”106 In accord with
Socony-Vacuum, the Court announced that it would not permit an
“inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad.”107 The
“Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption
that competition itself is unreasonable.”108 Similarly, in FTC v. Indiana
Federation of Dentists,109 the Court stated: “That a particular practice
may be unlawful is not, in itself, a sufficient justification for collusion
among competitors to prevent it.110
The strong language of these decisions and the broad rule they
articulate make it highly unlikely that the Court would create an excep-
tion for collusion to counteract buyer power. Yet the Court has not actu-
ally confronted the situation in which such an exception would be most
appealing—the classic case of monopsony, in which “a single buyer
faces a large number of suppliers, each too small to affect the market
price and each operating on an upward-sloping marginal cost curve.”111
In this setting, as any textbook treatment shows, the monopsonist will
purchase less than the competitive quantity, pay less than the competi-
tive price, and transfer wealth from the suppliers to itself.112 In such a
case, collusion by the suppliers would end their powerlessness and
enhance their ability to bargain with the buyer, likely raising the price
the suppliers receive and increasing the quantity they sell, producing a
result that is closer to the competitive outcome both upstream and down-
stream.113 If so, consumer welfare, supplier welfare, and total welfare
would all increase. In short, in the pure monopsony scenario, collusion
by the otherwise exploited suppliers could be desirable.114
105. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
106. Id. at 685.
107. Id. at 695.
108. Id. at 696; see also id. at 689 (stating that the Court has “unequivocally foreclose[d] an
interpretation of the Rule as permitting an inquiry into the reasonableness of the prices set by
private agreement.”).
109. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
110. Id. at 465.
111. See Kirkwood, supra note 27, at 1495 (identifying the essential characteristics of the
monopsony model).
112. Id. at 1495, 1497.
113. See infra notes 135, 147–49 and accompanying text.
114. This is not the only setting in which collusion to offset buyer power could be
procompetitive. Suppose the buyer itself has countervailing power (i.e., the suppliers have market
power, and the buyer’s power can be used to reduce that power). In this situation, the exercise of
buyer power is frequently procompetitive. See Kirkwood, supra note 27, at 1505–09. But in a
number of cases, the exercise of countervailing power by a large buyer can be anticompetitive. See
id. at 1506, 1536–58. When that is so, collusion by the suppliers to counteract that power could be
desirable, as discussed below.
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The Court has never explained why collusion by suppliers could
not be permitted in this setting, especially if strict limits like those laid
down in Part V were observed. In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass’n,115 however, the Court considered a similar situation in which an
association of small sellers—individual attorneys who represented indi-
gent criminal defendants—colluded to force the Washington, D.C. gov-
ernment—the only purchaser of these services—to raise their hourly
rates.116 The Association did not argue that the D.C. government had
monopsony power, perhaps because the attorneys could turn to other
types of practice fairly readily. Instead, the fundamental policy issue was
whether the per se rule should apply to the boycott when the pre-con-
spiracy rates, even if they were competitive by economic standards,
might well have been too low to provide the quality of representation
that society owed these indigent defendants.117 But that possibility, even
if true, would not change the result. The Court applied the per se rule,
declaring that “it is not our task to pass upon the social utility or political
wisdom of price-fixing agreements.”118
The only case to recognize an exception is Balmoral Cinema, Inc.
v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp.119 It involved the reverse of the situation
we have been discussing (small sellers facing a monopsony buyer). In
Balmoral Cinema, the sell-side of the market had market power and the
buy-side colluded to offset it. A group of film exhibitors had engaged in
a “split,” a type of horizontal restraint in which the exhibitors decide
which one of them will bid on a particular film; once that decision is
made, only one exhibitor bids on the film and the others refuse to deal
with the supplier.120 The plaintiff argued that this behavior should be
subject to the normal per se ban on group boycotts, but the Sixth Circuit
refused to apply the per se rule because the split may have increased the
115. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
116. Id. at 422–23.
117. Justice Stevens recognized the issue in a telling paragraph in the opinion, noting that
“[r]easonable lawyers may differ about the wisdom of this enforcement proceeding,” and that
“[r]espondents’ boycott may well have served a cause that was worthwhile and unpopular.” Id. at
421. Indeed, he was willing to “assume that the preboycott rates were unreasonably low, and that
the increase has produced better legal representation for indigent defendants.” Id.
118. Id. at 421–22. For decisions rejecting a countervailing power defense to collusion more
directly, see Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Thoughts on “Leveling the Playing
Field” in Health Care Markets, Remarks Before the Nat’l Health Lawyers Ass’n (Feb. 13, 1997)
in 1997 WL 80767 at *4 (asserting that if the defendants argue they need to create “a
countervailing force in order to neutralize a perceived imbalance in bargaining power, antitrust
law will not be receptive”) (citing United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 507 F. Supp. 412
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d mem., 659 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1981); Mich. State Med. Soc’y, 101 F.T.C.
191 (1983)).
119. 885 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989).
120. Id. at 314–15.
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exhibitors’ buying power, enabling them to pay lower license fees and
reduce ticket prices.121 The court stated: “Exhibitors, as purchasers of
films, may be justified in combating the market power of film suppliers
by group action. Such action may lower prices to moviegoers at the box
office and may serve rather than undermine consumer welfare.”122
Balmoral Cinema recognized that consumers may benefit when
buyers collude to counteract the market power of suppliers. It also
refused to protect those suppliers from conduct that diminishes their
welfare. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit implicitly made a subtle but impor-
tant distinction between two types of buy-side cases. In the first, small
competitive suppliers face a monopsonist, and the suppliers deserve pro-
tection from the unjustified exercise of such power. In the second, the
suppliers have market power, the buyer exercises countervailing power,
and the suppliers may not deserve protection because consumers may
benefit from the reduction of their power.123 In other respects, however,
the analysis in Balmoral Cinema was inadequate. The court did not
appreciate that the market power of the film suppliers derives, at least in
part, from the popularity of their films and that their incentive to develop
new films may be diminished if exhibitor collusion reduces their profits.
Moreover, if the exhibitors are allowed to collude to strengthen their
buying power, they may also collude on ticket prices, which would harm
consumers.
Balmoral Cinema, in short, is a perceptive but incomplete analysis
of a complicated issue. The scholarly analysis is much more thorough.
While most scholars, like Professors Hovenkamp and Elhauge, support
the case law, there are important exceptions, as the following section
explains.
B. Scholarship
Professors Hovenkamp and Elhauge would not allow suppliers or
buyers to collude to counteract power on the other side of the market.
They do not dispute that such collusion may sometimes enhance compe-
tition and consumer welfare. Indeed, when suppliers have market power,
Hovenkamp would permit buyers to combine to offset that power so
long as the buyers enter into purchasing cooperatives, rather than engage
121. Id. at 316–17.
122. Id.
123. See Zhiqi Chen, Buyer Power: Economic Theory and Antitrust Policy, 22 RES. L. &
ECON. 17, 18 (2007) (“[T]he competition effects of buyer power are quite different depending on
whether it is monopsony power against powerless suppliers or countervailing buyer power against
large suppliers with market power.”). For a summary of the principal differences between
monopsony power and countervailing power—differences in nature, prevalence, and effects—see
Kirkwood, supra note 27, at 1493–1512.
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in hard-core price fixing, even though the impact on the suppliers, the
buyers, and consumers may be exactly the same:
[W]hile countervailing power does not provide a defense against a
Sherman Act claim of buyer price fixing, it may be the rationale of
procompetitive joint purchasing. . . . By organizing into buying coop-
eratives or similar ventures, smaller buyers can force concentrated
sellers to behave more competitively toward the smaller buyers, thus
making the market more competitive. In fact, this is a fairly common
rationale of competitive joint purchasing.124
Absent some sort of integration, however, Hovenkamp would not let
buyers collude to exert countervailing power because he believes that
hard-core collusion is too dangerous to allow, given its frequent adverse
effects and the difficulty of determining its actual impact in a particular
case.
Hovenkamp supports this position in four ways. First, he asserts
that the claim that buyers have colluded to exercise procompetitive
countervailing power “would certainly be raised in almost any case
where the selling market is not perfectly competitive.”125 Second, “the
exertion of countervailing power typically does not improve the situa-
tion,”126 for the parties are likely to “share the monopoly power that
exists rather than strive to eliminate it.”127 Third, “the result can be
‘double marginalization,’ in which the [sellers’] cartel extracts its
monopoly overcharge and then the [buyers’] cartel adds an additional
overcharge.”128 Finally, “determining actual output effects in such cases
would involve the court in economic inquiries beyond its capacity.”129
Elhauge makes several additional points. He notes, for example,
that collusion to offset buyer power would be unnecessary in two situa-
tions. First, if the power was acquired illegally, it might well be elimi-
nated by challenging the conduct that created it.130 Second, if it were
124. 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2015b, at 164 (3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter 12
HOVENKAMP].
125. Id. at 162. Hovenkamp is of course addressing whether buyers ought to be allowed to
collude to offset seller market power. Doubtlessly, he would treat supplier collusion to offset
buyer power—the focus of this article—the same way. See 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 943e, at 258 (3d ed. 2009) (“Nor would we accept as a defense to
an otherwise unlawful merger that the merger was necessary to create countervailing power
offsetting the monopsony power of a single buyer or buyers’ cartel.”).
126. 12 HOVENKAMP, supra note 124, ¶ 2015b, at 162.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 163.
129. Id.
130. See EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 244
(2007). Pitofsky phrases the point more generally: “From a policy and enforcement perspective,
the most effective response to the emergence of excessive buyer power is not to permit the
aggregation of some form of countervailing power. Rather, the appropriate response is to try to
prevent the aggregation of excessive buying power in the first place.” Pitofsky, supra note 118, at
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“correctable by market forces,” it would likely disappear on its own.131
Elhauge also stresses that supplier collusion would be harmful in two
situations, even if the buyer’s power was legally acquired and likely to
persist. In the first, the extra profits provided by the power may “reflect
a desirable return for the investment . . . that created that . . .
power[.]”132 If so, collusion to reduce those returns would be counter-
productive. In the second situation, collusion would be harmful if it was
used, not to offset buyer power, but to cooperate with the buyer to
enhance downstream market power.133
While each of these objections has force, not all apply to the focus
of this article—supplier collusion to offset buyer power. For example,
Hovenkamp’s argument that the parties will simply share their existing
market power applies only to buyer collusion to offset seller market
power. When a buyer has monopsony power—but no downstream mar-
ket power—and sellers cannot create downstream market power by col-
luding, there will be no downstream market power to share. But there is
also a larger point. The objections raised by Hovenkamp and Elhauge do
not prove that buyer power can never justify seller collusion. They indi-
cate that such a justification would be valid only in narrow and carefully
specified circumstances.
Several scholars have built on this point, arguing that, in certain
settings, collusion to counteract buyer power should be allowed. In their
latest book on monopsony,134 for example, Professors Blair and Harri-
son assert that when competitive suppliers face a buyer with monopsony
power, supplier collaboration would enhance total welfare and consumer
welfare:
From the standpoint of social welfare, the structural condition of
bilateral monopoly is preferable to . . . a monopsony dealing with
competitive suppliers. If . . . rival sellers collaborate in response to
monopsony, the quantity sold increases, which will increase the
quantity of the final good. This result benefits consumer [welfare]
and, therefore, it is consistent with the most fundamental goal of the
antitrust [laws].135
*6. While Pitofsky’s approach is clearly correct when it is feasible, it is not always possible. When
buyer power has been acquired and maintained legally, it cannot be eliminated by antitrust action.
131. ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 130, at 244, 246.
132. Id. at 245.
133. Id.
134. ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (2010).
135. Id. at 136. Blair and Harrison do not contend that supplier collusion in response to
monopsony will achieve the perfectly competitive outcome. It will simply achieve a
procompetitive result: output and consumer welfare will increase. The difference occurs because,
as noted below, bargaining between the colluding sellers and the monopsonist is hampered by
transaction costs and information asymmetries, which make it unlikely that the parties will agree
on the competitive level of output. In the absence of these imperfections, however, the bargaining
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Blair and Harrison readily acknowledge that there are “limitations” to
accepting a buyer power justification for collusion.136 Collusion is a
“risky policy choice,”137 and it is always better to eliminate the down-
stream monopsony than to allow upstream collusion. But removing the
downstream monopsony is not always possible. Blair and Harrison also
recognize that when suppliers are allowed to collude to offset buyer
power, transaction costs will increase since the colluding sellers must
bargain among themselves and with the buyer to establish a new rela-
tionship. But those costs “will not be incurred unless the overall benefit
of achieving the joint profit-maximizing agreement offsets them.”138
This logic suggests, for example, that competing physicians ought
to be allowed to bargain collectively with a monopsonist insurance com-
pany, and Blair and Harrison take that position: “When the market for
health care services is competitive on the supply side and monopsonistic
on the buying side, cooperative bargaining by the health care providers
will have beneficial results for consumers.”139 They caution that this rec-
ommendation makes sense only where the health insurer is a true
monopsony. In that case, reimbursement rates would be below the com-
petitive level and doctors would be providing fewer services or spending
less time with their patients.140 In contrast, if the physicians face a set of
competing health plans, collusion by the physicians is likely to raise
reimbursement rates and lead to higher insurance premiums, harming
consumers. Thus, where state legislation authorizes the attorney general
to allow collective negotiations, they state that it is “the responsibility of
the attorney general to limit collective negotiations to those markets
where monopsony is a problem.”141 Since true monopsony is uncom-
mon, Blair and Harrison emphasize that seller collusion can be justified
only in a “few relatively rare situations.”142 But in those situations, it
would be beneficial.
would result in the competitive outcome, as Blair and Harrison demonstrate formally. The
intuition behind this result is easy to understand. Imagine that instead of an input market
consisting of competitive sellers facing a powerful buyer, there is a single, vertically integrated
firm that produces the inputs and uses them to manufacture a final product. If that firm had no
downstream market power (i.e., no power in the final product market), it would maximize its
profits by producing at the point where its marginal cost equals the downstream market price.
That, of course, is the competitive outcome and it explains why, when colluding sellers face a
monopsonist without downstream market power, the parties have a strong incentive to achieve the
competitive outcome. That outcome maximizes their joint profits.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 140.
138. Id. at 138.
139. Id. at 208.
140. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 134, at 207.
141. Id. at 211.
142. Id. at 140.
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Professor Campbell first made this point in 2007: “Contrary to the
conventional wisdom, bilateral monopoly is better for consumers than a
monopsonist buying from competitive suppliers.”143 Likewise, he would
allow collective negotiations between physicians and an insurance com-
pany with monopsony power.144 Campbell’s article provoked a response
from Professors Baker, Farrell, and Shapiro, who argue that he over-
stated the benefits of collusion to offset monopsony power.145 They
assert that when competitive sellers face a monopsony, collusion by
those sellers will not inevitably result in the efficient level of output, as
it does in the bilateral monopoly model. To the contrary, in the presence
of imperfect information and incomplete contracts, bilateral monopoly is
likely to result in a smaller quantity.146 This critique, however, shows
only that bilateral monopoly is unlikely to result in the optimal level of
output in the real world. It does not establish that collusion to offset
monopsony power would not improve the situation—raising output,
benefiting consumers, and enhancing supplier welfare. In fact, it is likely
to do so. As Baker, Farrell, and Shapiro acknowledge, both the colluding
sellers and the monopsonist have an incentive to increase output, since
that would increase their total profits.147 Moreover, by colluding, the
sellers have substantially increased their ability to force the buyer to
make this mutually advantageous change.148 Because of the procompeti-
143. Tom Campbell, Bilateral Monopoly in Mergers, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 521 (2007).
144. Tom Campbell, Bilateral Monopoly: Further Comment, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 647, 647–48
(2008) (“[T]he greatest likely area for the application of my policy advice . . . is . . . where
individual physicians are attempting to bargain more effectively against monopsonistic insurance
companies by banding together.”). Campbell supports his position by noting that two statutory
exemptions from the antitrust laws share the same rationale:
Agricultural cooperatives, for example, are granted an exemption under the Capper
Volstead Act, because of the assumption that farmers would otherwise be forced to
sell only to one, or a few, powerful buyers. Labor unions receive an exemption as
well, based on the premise that, at least in the specific locale, there is only one or a
few dominant employers (purchasers) for the labor being offered.
Campbell, supra note 143, at 523.
145. See Jonathan B. Baker, Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Merger to Monopoly to Serve a
Single Buyer: Comment, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 637 (2008).
146. Id. at 638 (“In widespread circumstances, a buyer will limit its quantity so as to influence
the seller’s perception of its willingness to pay for the product. As a result, inefficiently low
quantities routinely result from bilateral bargaining under asymmetric information.”).
147. Id. (“We agree with Campbell that two parties engaged in bargaining—such as a single
buyer negotiating with a single seller—have an incentive to trade the quantity that will maximize
their joint profits.” (emphasis added)).
148. In the analogous situation—when buyers merge to exert countervailing power against a
monopoly seller—output is likely to increase. See James Mellsop & Kevin Counsell, Antitrust
Insights: Assessing the Implications of Upstream Buyer Power on Downstream Consumers,
ANTITRUST INSIGHTS, Summer 2009, at 3 (“[W]here the buyer has some bargaining power, it can
extract some of the monopolist’s surplus, and to do so generally results in a higher quantity of
input purchased than in the pure monopoly case, even if this is not necessarily the joint profit
maximizing quantity.”); see also Jonathan M. Jacobsen & Gary J. Dorman, Joint Purchasing,
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tive consequences of bilateral monopoly, Professors Hammer and Sage
state, “[t]wo market failures are sometimes better than one.”149
Professor Grimes also supports an exception to the per se rule when
small suppliers face a buyer (or group of buyers) with monopsony
power.150 Absent this exception, the suppliers are likely to be exploited,
and output is likely to fall, which would not only harm the suppliers but
also diminish the well-being of consumers. “The very nature of monop-
sony or oligopsony power,” Grimes states, “is that it tends to suppress
output and reduce quality or choice.”151 He, too, is sensitive to the need
to limit the exception, since a blanket permission to collude, whenever
there is power on the other side of the market, is “likely to work much
anticompetitive mischief . . . .”152 Suppose that “a group of steel produc-
ers agree to coordinate price and output because they face powerful buy-
ers in the automobile industry . . . .”153 If that is allowed, “it will be
difficult to prevent steel producers from coordinating their action toward
other, perhaps less powerful buyers. Aircraft and appliance manufactur-
ers, for example, would now face the market power of the associated
steel producers.”154 To avoid such undesirable results, Grimes proposes
a set of conditions that must be satisfied before collusion to counteract
buyer power is permitted.155 If these conditions are satisfied—conditions
that limit the defense to “readily identifiable fact patterns in which
anticompetitive risks are low and procompetitive potential is signifi-
cant”156—the goals of antitrust law would be advanced, not
undermined.157
Monopsony and Antitrust, 36 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 19 (1991) (stating that bilateral monopoly “is
almost never worse than the simple monopoly outcome . . . and is generally better for downstream
consumers since the bargaining war will tend to push prices and output in the direction of the
competitive level”); Kirkwood, supra note 27, at 1533 (analyzing the issue and concluding that “a
merger of buyers that creates a bilateral monopoly—but no downstream market power—is likely
to be procompetitive”).
149. Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Monopsony as an Agency and Regulatory Problem
in Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 949, 966 n.74 (2004).
150. See Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act’s Unintended Bias Against Lilliputians: Small
Players’ Collective Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 195
(2001).
151. Id. at 210.
152. Id. at 232.
153. Id. at 200.
154. Id. at 200–01.
155. See id. at 234; see also infra note 157 (quoting the conditions).
156. Grimes, supra note 150, at 233–34.
157. The specific conditions he proposes, however, may not be optimal. Professor Grimes
frames them as elements of a defense to a charge of price fixing:
There are three parts to the limited defense: (1) a safe harbor for small players with
a collective market share of 20 percent or less in any relevant market . . . ; (2) a safe
harbor for all similarly situated small players that sell or buy exclusively from a
power player possessing relational market power . . . ; and (3) a near-miss fallback
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The key issue, then, is whether an exception to the per se rule can
be circumscribed sufficiently. The scholars who oppose it do so not
because they believe that collusion to control a powerful customer can
never be justified. They oppose it because they think the defense would
be asserted too frequently and businesses and courts could not readily
determine when collusion to offset buyer power would in fact be
procompetitive.158 Part V attempts to meet these concerns by developing
a set of criteria that are tightly limited, easily understood, and readily
applied. If this effort is successful, it would further the goals of the anti-
trust laws.
C. Goals of the Antitrust Laws
As a recent symposium demonstrated, scholars still disagree about
the overarching goal of antitrust law.159 Some assert that its fundamental
purpose is to protect the competitive process.160 Others argue that the
ultimate goal is total welfare.161 Most now maintain that the predomi-
nant objective is consumer welfare.162 That does not mean, of course,
rule of reason standard for small players that demonstrate that their collective action
is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects.
Id. at 234. Condition (1) seems too narrow. If a hundred small sellers face a single buyer with
monopsony power, why allow only twenty percent of the sellers to combine? This group may
have insufficient bargaining power to force the monopsonist to change its terms, and the other
sellers would continue to be exploited. Similarly, condition (2) seems under inclusive. It applies
only to “relational market power”—power that arises when a small seller makes a “financial and
psychological commitment to an enduring commercial relationship”—not to other forms of buyer
power, including monopsony power. Id. at 198. Finally, condition (3) seems too costly, remitting
courts and businesses to a rule of reason inquiry to determine whether the sellers’ collusion was
procompetitive.
158. See, e.g., ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 130, at 246.
159. See Barak Orbach, The Goals of Antitrust Foreword: The Pursuit of Purpose, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2151 (2013). Likewise, the world’s competition authorities have not reached a
consensus. See Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 567–68
(2012) (describing the varying objectives reported by members of the International Competition
Network).
160. See Gregory J. Werden, Monopsony and the Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a New
Light, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 707, 727 (2007) (stating that “the Court’s decisions have consistently
held that the Sherman Act protects the competitive process”); Eleanor M. Fox, Against Goals, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 2157, 2160 (2013) (“Let us call this objective ‘robust markets,’ and let us
consider the general objective of antitrust to proscribe acts that significantly undermine robust
markets.”).
161. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659 (2010); Louis Kaplow, On the Choice of Welfare Standards in
Competition Law, in THE GOALS OF COMPETITION LAW 3 (Daniel Zimmer, ed., 2012); Roger D.
Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Enforcement, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2497 (2013).
162. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 435 (2009) (“The Antitrust Standard is Consumer Welfare,
Not Total Welfare”); Steven C. Salop, Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare
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that antitrust should stop any practice that harms consumers, whether or
not it has an adverse effect on competition. The purpose of antitrust
law—of competition law—is to combat conduct that both diminishes
competition and reduces consumer welfare.163 For this reason, the fun-
damental goal of antitrust law is best described as protecting “consumers
from anticompetitive conduct—conduct that creates market power,
transfers wealth from consumers to producers, and fails to provide con-
sumers with compensating benefits.”164 This goal, and a parallel goal for
Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336
(2010); Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust:
Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2349
(2013); Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471,
2477 (2013) (“In sum, antitrust policy in the United States follows a consumer welfare approach
in that it condemns restraints that actually result in monopoly output reductions, whether or not
there are offsetting efficiencies and regardless of their size.”).
163. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ii–iii (2007)
(stating that antitrust is for competition and consumers). To illustrate the difference between
conduct that hurts consumers but not competition, and conduct that harms both, consider a firm
that occasionally produces defective toasters. The firm’s behavior would harm the consumers who
bought its defective toasters, but it would not diminish market rivalry. It would not reduce the
ability or the incentive of other firms in the market to compete. As a result, the firm’s conduct
might constitute a tort, a breach of warranty, or a type of deception, but it would not be an
antitrust violation.
Suppose, however, that a firm adopts a strategy of producing all its toasters in a substandard
way and charging lower prices as a result, yet advertising them as effective appliances. Such
behavior would distort market rivalry because it would divert sales from other toaster
manufacturers through improper means. As a result, it might constitute an “unfair method of
competition” in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. See William E.
Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 945 (2010) (“[B]efore 1938, the Commission
routinely challenged such practices as deception, lotteries, and commercial bribery as unfair
methods.”).
More recently, however, the Commission has moved away from this approach, focusing
instead on conduct that reduces rivalry to such a degree that it affects market-wide prices and
output. See id. at 946. Under this narrower approach, conduct would not be anticompetitive
merely because it distorted rivalry and harmed consumers; it would have to create market power.
This brings Section 5 more closely into line with the principal antitrust laws, the Sherman Act and
the Clayton Act, which are targeted largely, if not exclusively, at practices that create market
power. See generally John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust:
Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 201 (2008). For
an argument that Section 5 should not be so limited—that it ought to reach competition-distorting
practices like bribery and deception that lack any redeeming value, even if they do not raise
prices—see Maurice E. Stucke, A Response to Commissioner Wright’s Proposed Policy Statement
Regarding Unfair Methods of Competition, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, Sept. 2013, at 4–5; see
also Neil W. Averitt, The Elements of a Policy Statement on Section 5, 13 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1,
11 (2013) (maintaining that Section 5 should cover practices like bribery of purchasing agents and
industrial espionage if they are widespread in an industry and harm customers).
164. See Kirkwood, supra note 98, at 2429. In a buy-side case, the fundamental goal would be
comparable: protecting small, powerless suppliers from conduct that creates monopsony power,
“transfers wealth from suppliers to buyers,” and fails to “provide suppliers with offsetting
benefits.” See id.
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buy-side cases, has (I believe) the widest support, not only in the legisla-
tive history and language of the antitrust statutes, but also in the case
law, the preferences of the American people, and the ease of
administration.165
If collusion to control a powerful customer satisfied the demanding
criteria set forth in Part V, it would further virtually all of these goals. It
would not, of course, preserve the competitive process upstream, if that
process is defined solely as a process of rivalry among upstream suppli-
ers. But it would promote the competitive process downstream because
it would increase output, frequently lower prices, and sometimes
enhance innovation, making the suppliers’ offerings—or products made
from those offerings—more attractive to downstream purchasers,
increasing downstream rivalry. For the same reasons, it would enhance
consumer welfare and total welfare. Further, if collusion to control a
powerful customer were in fact both procompetitive downstream and
welfare enhancing, it would not offend the fundamental goal of antitrust
law. While it would create market power, it would also correct a market
failure—the anticompetitive exercise of buyer power—and benefit
rather than harm consumers.
1. COMPETITIVE PROCESS
Hard-core collusion is widely viewed as a direct affront to the com-
petitive process. If it involves price or output, it is per se illegal, com-
monly prosecuted criminally, and sometimes described as the most
heinous antitrust offense.166 But collusion to control a powerful cus-
tomer is different from common, hard-core price fixing. Unlike the lat-
ter, collusion to control a powerful customer would benefit consumers
and enhance downstream competition, so long as it satisfied the require-
ments of Part V. Thus, even if the principal goal of antitrust law were to
protect the competitive process, collusion to control a powerful customer
would serve that goal in a substantial way. By counteracting the undesir-
able effects of buyer power, it would improve the competitive process
downstream.
More important, protecting the competitive process should not,
without further elaboration, be the overarching goal of antitrust law. As
many scholars and policymakers have observed, the term “competitive
process” is too vague by itself to distinguish between restraints on
rivalry that are desirable and restraints that are undesirable.167 Mergers
165. See generally id.
166. See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 162, at 436 n.104; Stucke, supra note 159, at 569–70;
Kirkwood, supra note 98, at 2427.
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among competitors, for example, are limits on rivalry—they completely
eliminate competition between the merging parties—but antitrust law
properly permits some horizontal mergers and prohibits others. Which
mergers should be permitted? The answer cannot be determined by look-
ing at the competitive process alone, if that term refers exclusively to the
number of rivals or to the existence of rivalry among them, because a
merger that lowers price also reduces the number of rivals and elimi-
nates rivalry between two of them. The test is whether the merger is
likely to harm or benefit consumers in the relevant market.168 In the case
of a merger that may enhance monopsony power, the test is analogous—
whether it is likely to harm or benefit small suppliers in the relevant
market.169 Anticompetitive conduct is thus conduct that both restricts
rivalry and harms consumers or small suppliers.
To be sure, the term “competitive process” could easily be reinter-
preted to mean a process of rivalry that benefits consumers in sell-side
cases and small suppliers in buy-side cases. Under that definition, con-
duct that interferes with the competitive process would be conduct that
both restrains rivalry and injures consumers or small suppliers. So speci-
168. See Elhauge, supra note 162, at 436 n.104 (“But what does the ‘competitive process’
mean? It cannot turn on whether the process involves more competitors or more competitive
behavior among them, for antitrust law allows mergers that reduce the number of competitors and
joint ventures that limit competitive behavior if they benefit consumer welfare . . . .”). Thus,
courts consider efficiencies in evaluating a merger only to the extent that the efficiencies would
benefit consumers in the relevant market. See Kirkwood & Lande, supra note 163, at 225:
No court in the United States . . . has ever allowed a merger that was likely to
increase prices in the relevant market (or otherwise deprive consumers of the
choices a competitive market would provide) on the ground that it was likely to
enhance economic efficiency. To the contrary, the courts have uniformly insisted
that merging parties cannot establish an efficiencies defense unless they show both
that the merger would generate significant cost savings and that enough of those
savings would be passed on to consumers that consumers would benefit from (or at
least not be hurt by) the merger.
The federal government’s merger guidelines take the same position, asking whether efficiencies
would prevent harm to consumers in the relevant market. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED.
TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (“[T]he Agencies
consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the merger’s
potential to harm customers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price increases in that
market.”); Hovenkamp, supra note 162, at 2476–77 (stating that, under the 2010 Guidelines, “if
the merger is likely to result in a market-wide output reduction and price increase . . . then the
proponents of the merger will have an opportunity to show compensating efficiencies. But the
magnitude of the efficiencies must be sufficiently large to offset any predicted price increase. In
sum, the merger will be permitted only where there is no consumer harm, regardless of the size of
the efficiencies.”).
169. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 168, § 12 (describing a merger of the
only two buyers of an agricultural product in a relevant geographic market and noting that it
would have anticompetitive effects even if it did not hurt consumers; specifically, it would
“depress the price paid to farmers for this product, causing a transfer of wealth from farmers to the
merged firm and inefficiently reducing supply”).
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fied, “competitive process” would be an appropriate goal, congruent
with the fundamental objectives described above. But if “competitive
process” refers only to a process of rivalry, and any limitation on this
rivalry is objectionable regardless of the consequences, the term is not
only too narrow, but also affirmatively harmful.
2. CONSUMER WELFARE, SUPPLIER WELFARE, AND TOTAL WELFARE
Collusion to control a powerful customer, if it satisfied the require-
ments set forth in Part V, would raise supply prices, increase output or
innovation, and frequently lower prices or enhance choice downstream.
These effects would increase the welfare of suppliers and the welfare of
consumers. They would also increase total welfare because, if the collu-
sion met the requirements of Part V, it would counteract the inefficient
exercise of buyer power without harming downstream consumers. In
short, collusion to control a powerful customer, if it satisfied the criteria
of Part V, would advance all the welfare goals of antitrust.
3. PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT
Finally, such collusion would not offend the fundamental goal of
antitrust law. As described above, in a sell-side case like e-books, that
goal is to protect consumers from anticompetitive conduct—conduct
that creates market power, transfers wealth from consumers to produc-
ers, and fails to provide consumers with compensating benefits. Collu-
sion to control a powerful customer, if it satisfied the criteria of Part V,
would not constitute such conduct. It would not transfer wealth from
consumers, and it would not harm them on balance. While it would cre-
ate upstream market power, it would provide consumers with compen-
sating benefits, counteracting the anticompetitive exercise of buyer
power by increasing output and frequently lowering prices or enhancing
innovation.170
In the e-books case, in contrast, the publishers’ collusion, abetted
by Apple, did not meet the requirements of Part V. Instead, it almost
certainly harmed consumers and was properly condemned.
170. Collusion to control a powerful customer would of course harm that customer. That
creates an issue because it normally makes sense to pursue the fundamental goal of antitrust law
by examining the effects of the challenged conduct on direct purchasers, not ultimate consumers.
See Kirkwood, supra note 98, at 2450 (noting that while ultimate consumers are the protected
class, it simplifies litigation, increases business certainty, and generally reaches the right result to
focus the inquiry on direct purchasers). In this context, however, conduct cannot be judged
anticompetitive because it hurts the direct purchaser, for the direct purchaser is the source of the
problem and the purpose of the collusion is to counteract the undesirable effects of its power.
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IV. THE ASSERTED NEED TO CONTROL AMAZON
Although Amazon is a powerful buyer, it exerts countervailing
power, not monopsony power. As a result, the publishers could not jus-
tify their collusion on the ground that it would counteract the undesir-
able effects of monopsony power. The more plausible justification,
judged by the number of critics who asserted it, was that Amazon was
engaged in predatory pricing. In fact, though, the evidence strongly sug-
gests that Amazon was selling popular e-books below cost in order to
stimulate sales of Kindles (and other Amazon products), not to drive out
rival e-book sellers and raise prices. In other words, it is likely that
Amazon was engaged in loss leading rather than predatory pricing, and
loss leading is ordinarily procompetitive.171 Moreover, even if Amazon
had been engaged in true predation, the remedy was a lawsuit, not
collusion.
Amazon’s exercise of countervailing power was more troubling. By
reducing publisher margins, it could have curtailed the number of new
titles produced and reduced the welfare of consumers and authors. There
is no evidence, however, that Amazon’s demands for concessions actu-
ally resulted in any reduction in consumer choice. While that could hap-
pen in the future, the danger was reduced by the decline in Amazon’s
market share and the entry of major new rivals such as Apple, Google,
and Microsoft. Amazon’s buying power, in short, did not justify a con-
spiracy that imposed immediate and substantial price increases on
consumers.
A. Monopsony Power
As Part III.B indicated, the defense for collusion that has the great-
est support in the literature is the defense for small, powerless suppliers
facing a monopsonist. In the e-books market, however, Amazon did not
have monopsony power—the kind of buyer power that is symmetric to
monopoly power, modeled in economic textbooks, and fundamental to
the thesis of the scholars cited above.172
171. As explained below, loss leading is usually procompetitive because the sale of a few
products below cost is often an effective promotional device: it causes consumers to buy other
products from the seller. And, unlike predatory pricing, it does not normally drive out (or
otherwise harm) rival sellers and thus does not result in an eventual supracompetitive price
increase on the products sold below cost. While loss leading can sometimes have a predatory
impact, the circumstances required for predatory loss leading did not appear to be present with
Amazon’s e-book pricing.
172. When Blair and Harrison refer to monopsony, they mean textbook monopsony power. See
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 134, at 41–67 (“Economic Theory of Monopsony”) (reproducing
the textbook model). So does Campbell. In explaining the advantages of bilateral monopoly over a
“monopsonist buying from competitive suppliers,” he relies on textbook monopsony analysis. For
example, he states: “In the case of one buyer and many sellers, the classical monopsony buyer
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-1\MIA101.txt unknown Seq: 35  5-DEC-14 11:32
2014] COLLUSION TO CONTROL A POWERFUL CUSTOMER 35
In the textbook monopsony model, a single buyer purchases from a
competitive tier of suppliers, each without market power and each pro-
ducing on an upward-sloping marginal cost curve.173 In this model, the
buyer will purchase less than the competitive or efficient quantity,174
and collusion by the suppliers is likely to reduce this problem, raising
output up to—or at least closer to—the competitive level.175 But neither
the e-books market nor the print books market matches the monopsony
model. On the demand side, the suppliers—book publishers—are not
perfectly competitive; they do not all produce the same homogenous
product. To the contrary, their products are differentiated, each with
some degree of market power.176 On the supply side, the publishers do
not normally confront rising marginal costs as they increase the output
of a particular title. Rather, over a large range of output, their marginal
costs are flat.177 Together, these two factors—some market power and
constant marginal costs—mean that publishers, unlike the competitive
sellers of the monopsony model, price above marginal cost. In this
respect, book publishers are like software publishers: they incur substan-
tial fixed costs to develop and market a product but can generate another
copy of the product at a low marginal cost, sometimes near zero. In this
situation, both types of publishers, in order to cover their fixed costs,
must price above marginal cost.178
stops buying before reaching the competitive level of purchases.” Campbell, supra note 143, at
521.
173. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 135, 147–49 and accompanying text.
176. See Mellsop & Counsell, supra note 148, at 6 (“[T]he evidence suggests that [book]
publishers are likely to have some market power of their own . . . [since they are] the copyright
holder for particular titles.”).
177. In the case of an e-book, the marginal cost to the publisher of generating an additional
copy for a consumer is near zero and does not change as more copies are downloaded. See
Epstein, supra note 9 (“But the marginal price for the production of an additional eBook is close
to zero . . . .”). In the case of a print book, the marginal cost is higher, but still constant over the
usual range of output. See Mellsop & Counsell, supra note 148, at 6 (noting that publishers
typically price books on a per unit basis, which they characterize as “simple variable cost pricing,”
implying that variable costs—and thus marginal costs—do not rise with output).
178. Baker, Farrell, and Shapiro state that “in [their] experience” suppliers with market power
commonly price above marginal cost and identify “vendors of business software” as an example:
While marginal cost pricing no doubt arises in some cases, in our experience
suppliers with market power that negotiate customer-specific prices very often
charge each customer a price for marginal units that is well above marginal cost. . . .
Likewise, vendors of business software that negotiate individual prices with
corporate customers do not routinely charge them zero (marginal cost) for each
additional “seat” or user of that software.
Baker, Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 145, at 640. While the authors limit their assertion to
suppliers that “negotiate customer-specific prices,” the point is broader. Id. If marginal costs are
low and flat over the relevant range of output, suppliers must price above those costs to cover their
fixed expenses, whether or not they negotiate customer-specific prices.
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If book publishers are pricing above marginal cost, then a price cut
induced by a powerful buyer like Amazon would not, as in the monop-
sony model, lead to a reduction in output.179 Instead, it may generate an
increase in output, since the buyer’s own marginal costs fall with a
decline in the price it pays for a key input. In other words, if Amazon
pays less, on a per unit basis, for books, its own marginal costs will fall,
which is likely to cause it to lower its retail prices, leading to greater unit
sales. In this setting, the appropriate model of buyer power is not
monopsony power, but countervailing power, and the exercise of coun-
tervailing power may result in greater output and lower retail prices. In
this context, therefore, collusion by suppliers to offset buyer power may
not be desirable; it may eliminate the procompetitive effects of counter-
vailing power. While countervailing power can also have anticompeti-
tive effects, and collusion to offset it might be justifiable, that requires a
more complicated analysis.180 The point here is that the best established
buyer power justification for collusion—the monopsony power justifica-
tion—was unavailable to the book publishers. The most frequently
asserted justification, discussed next, also appeared inapt.
B. Predatory Pricing
Many critics of the e-books case argued that Amazon was engaged
in predatory pricing and that collusion to halt this conduct was desirable.
They claimed that forcing Amazon to raise its prices helped preserve
brick-and-mortar booksellers and insulate consumers from an Amazon
monopoly.181 This possible justification, however, suffers from two seri-
ous problems: it was almost certainly not supported by the evidence, and
it appears incorrect as a matter of antitrust policy.
179. In the monopsony model, in which suppliers face rising marginal costs, a price reduction
ordinarily causes them to curtail output. When they are paid less, their profit-maximizing level of
output falls. An exception can occur if the monopsonist has so much power that it can make “all or
nothing” demands on the suppliers, confronting them with the choice of accepting the
monopsonist’s price or selling nothing at all. In the extreme case, the monopsonist can force the
suppliers to produce the competitive level of output at a price that covers only their variable costs,
depriving them of their entire producers surplus. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 134, at
83–84. This case did not occur in book publishing because a price this low would completely
remove the publishers’ incentive to develop new books. They could not defray any of their fixed
costs of selecting, editing, and producing new titles. On the other hand, in exercising the type of
buyer power it did have—countervailing power—Amazon might have made demands on the
publishers that reduced their margins and caused them to curtail the number, quality, or variety of
new titles they produced. That concern is discussed in Part IV.C below.
180. See infra Part IV.C.
181. See supra notes 10–15. More recently, Paul Aiken, Executive Director of the Authors
Guild, summed up the argument: “‘If the publishers colluded, it was to blunt Amazon
dominance.’” David Streitfeld, E-Book Ruling Gives Amazon an Advantage, N.Y. TIMES, July 11,
2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/business/e-book-ruling-gives-
amazon-an-advantage.html.
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1. UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
Critics of the government’s case fastened on Amazon’s huge share
of e-book sales and its below-cost pricing of many titles. From these
facts, the critics argued that Amazon was engaged in predatory pricing
and intended to build a durable monopoly.182 The evidence indicates,
however, that it would be very difficult to establish the elements of a
predatory pricing case.
i. Dangerous Probability of Monopolization
To prove that Amazon’s pricing violated Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, a plaintiff would have to show, first of all, that Amazon’s conduct
created a dangerous probability of monopoly power.183 Its large share of
the e-books market would help establish that element. The Justice
Department defined the relevant market as the sale in the United States
of trade books in electronic formats, and Apple (the only defendant to
litigate) did not dispute that definition.184 In that market, at the time the
publishers and Apple were conspiring, Amazon’s share was almost
ninety percent,185 which is more than enough, looking at share alone, to
infer actual monopoly power and, even more clearly, a dangerous
probability of such power.
Amazon could not build a durable monopoly, however, without
substantial barriers to entry, and these are less clear. To be sure, it
engaged in below-cost pricing and, if that were sufficiently pervasive
and persistent, it might create a reputation for predation that would deter
entry. But, as noted below, its below-cost pricing was limited in scope
and significant entry occurred while it was going on. In the face of such
entry, which reduced Amazon’s market share by a third, it would be
difficult to demonstrate a dangerous probability of actual
monopolization.186
182. See, e.g., Hiltzik, supra note 8 (“Amazon’s $9.99 price often meant it was selling books at
a loss, presumably to cement its dominance of a market that it then controlled to the tune of
90%.”).
183. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993)
(stating that “§ 2 of the Sherman Act . . . condemn[s] predatory pricing when it poses ‘a dangerous
probability of actual monopolization’”) (quoting Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S.
447, 455 (1993)).
184. See United States v. Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 694 n.60 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Trade books,
whether in print or electronic format, “consist of general interest fiction and non-fiction books”
and “are to be distinguished from ‘non-trade’ books such as academic textbooks, reference
materials, and other texts.” Id. at 648 n.4.
185. Id. at 649 (“Through 2009, Amazon dominated the e-book retail market, selling nearly
90% of all e-books.”).
186. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (“[I]t is undisputed that Amazon’s market share
in e-books decreased from 90 to 60 percent in the two years following the introduction of agency
pricing.”). This does not mean that entry was extremely easy or that every potential entrant was
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ii. Below-Cost Pricing
A predatory pricing plaintiff must also show that the defendant
engaged in below-cost pricing.187 On many of Amazon’s sales of e-
books, this element could be established. Prior to 2009, publishers dis-
counted their e-books to reflect the lower costs of electronic production
and distribution—Amazon’s $9.99 price at the time was roughly
equivalent to its acquisition cost.188 But, beginning in 2009, when pub-
lishers removed this discount, the price Amazon paid rose several dol-
lars, yet Amazon continued to offer many newly released and bestselling
e-book titles for $9.99. At that point, the district court found, Amazon
was pricing below cost.189
Amazon did not, however, price all its e-books below cost. To the
contrary, the Justice Department investigated the issue and found that,
when total e-book revenues were compared to total acquisition costs,
Amazon had not incurred losses.190 Judge Cote did not affirm this con-
clusion, declaring instead that this case was not the occasion to deter-
mine whether Amazon’s pricing was an unfair trade practice or
otherwise illegal.191 But she repeatedly referred to Amazon’s aggressive
pricing as “loss leading,” not predatory pricing,192 and never indicated
that it had caused an overall loss to Amazon’s e-book business.193 By
equally well positioned to capture market share. Apple obtained substantial concessions from the
publishers because it was America’s best-known high-tech firm and was ready to introduce
another innovation: the iPad. If numerous entrants could have achieved what Apple promised, the
publishers would not have made such substantial concessions to Apple. Instead, they would have
turned to another potential entrant.
187. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222 (“[A] plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury
resulting from a rival’s low prices must prove that the prices complained of are below an
appropriate measure of its rival’s costs.”).
188. See Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 649 (describing the pre-2009 discount and stating: “With a
digital book discount, Amazon’s $9.99 price point roughly matched the wholesale price of many
of its e-books.”).
189. See id. at 650 (stating that once the e-book discount was eliminated, “the wholesale price
that Amazon paid for an e-book would be set at several dollars above Amazon’s $9.99 price
point,” causing Amazon to sell many e-books at a “loss”).
190. See Response of Plaintiff United States to Public Comments on the Proposed Final
Judgment, supra note 5, at 21–22 (“In the course of its investigation, the United States examined
complaints about Amazon’s alleged predatory practices and found persuasive evidence lacking.
As is alleged in the Complaint, the United States concluded, based on its investigation and review
of data from Amazon and others, that ‘[f]rom the time of its launch, Amazon’s e-book distribution
business has been consistently profitable, even when substantially discounting some newly
released and bestselling titles.’”).
191. Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
192. E.g., id. (referring to “Amazon’s choice to sell NYT Bestsellers or other New Releases as
loss leaders”); id. at 650 (stating that Amazon “continued to sell many NYT Bestsellers as loss
leaders at $9.99”).
193. In fact, she noted in an earlier decision that “none of [the public comments attempt] to
show that Amazon’s e-book prices as a whole were below its marginal costs.” Opinion & Order,
supra note 4, at 40. To be sure, Amazon need not have priced all its e-books below cost in order to
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using the term “loss leading,” Judge Cote implied that Amazon’s below-
cost pricing was (a) selective rather than pervasive, and (b) not intended
to generate monopoly power. That is, its goal was not to drive out rival
e-book retailers and thereby gain the power to raise e-book prices to
monopoly levels, but to stimulate additional sales, at existing prices, of
other products sold by Amazon, particularly its Kindles. This suggests
that Amazon’s behavior also failed to satisfy the final element of a pred-
atory pricing claim—recoupment.194
iii. Recoupment
Amazon could recoup its investment in below-cost pricing of e-
books either by selling more Kindles and other Amazon products (loss
leading), or by raising the price of e-books above the competitive level
(predatory pricing). Several considerations suggest that Amazon was
pursuing the first strategy, not the second. The difference matters, of
course, both legally and normatively, because loss leading, unlike preda-
tory pricing, does not normally cause consumer harm.
First, like Judge Cote, a number of commentators characterized
Amazon’s aggressive pricing as loss leading, not predation.195 Second,
as these commentators recognized, loss leading readily fits the facts
because Amazon has never sold all of its e-books below cost, which is
an approach it might take if it was determined to impose maximum
losses on competing e-book sellers. Third, as the price of e-readers has
fallen—and thus the gains from promoting the sale of these devices have
diminished—Amazon has cut back its discounting of e-books. Critics of
the e-books case claimed that if pricing authority were ever returned to
Amazon, it would resume—or even intensify—its aggressive pricing of
engage in an effective predatory strategy. If an entrant offered only the most popular e-books, it
could be excluded by selective price cutting, just as it could be excluded by loss leading, as noted
below. But neither strategy would exclude entrants who offer a broad range of e-books. Moreover,
as the next section details, several large firms entered—or remained—in the market despite
Amazon’s price cutting, suggesting that Amazon’s strategy, whatever it is called, was not an
effective exclusionary device.
194. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224
(stating that, under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the final “prerequisite to holding a competitor
liable under the antitrust laws for charging low prices is a demonstration that the competitor had
a . . . dangerous probability, of recouping its investment in below-cost prices”).
195. See, e.g., Jim Milliot, The Fight for the Future, PUB. WKLY. (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.
publishersweekly.com/pw/print/20100208/41971-the-fight-for-the-future.html (“Amazon has been
losing on the $9.99 e-books, but was willing to let them be loss leaders to grab market share, sell
more Kindles, and, according to Hildick-Smith [founder of the research firm Codex Group],
increase the overall amount of money consumers spend at Amazon on e-books and print books.”);
Rich & Stone, supra note 62, at B5 (“Because Amazon has discounted the price of most new and
popular e-books on its Kindle e-reader to $9.99, it loses money on most of those sales. Amazon’s
goal has been strategic: it aims to establish a low price for e-books that will have the ancillary
benefit of helping it sell more Kindle devices.”).
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e-books.196 By most accounts, that has not happened.197 Instead, prices
of many popular e-books appear to be higher than they were prior to the
introduction of the agency model in 2010.198 And that has coincided
with a fall in the price of Kindles, suggesting that Amazon’s pricing of
e-books has been driven by the profits it could make selling Kindles,
rather than by the returns it could achieve if it attained monopoly power
in the e-books market.199 In addition, Amazon would put a dent in its
pro-consumer image if it ever raised e-book prices sharply, indicating,
yet again, that its goal was to sell more Kindles and other products, not
to exploit consumers.200
Finally, the prospect of an Amazon monopoly has diminished as
several other firms, large and small, have entered the e-books market.
Apple entered when it launched the iPad and, while that entry was artifi-
196. See Brian X. Chen & Julie Bosman, Trial on E-Book Price-Fixing Puts Apple in the
Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2013, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/03/
technology/e-book-antitrust-case-against-apple-to-begin.html?pagewanted=all (“After the lawsuit
was filed, the expectation was that e-book prices would drop sharply; the publishers that settled
agreed to allow retailers to discount their e-books for two years.”).
197. Id. (“But the price drop has still not happened.”); David Streitfeld, Little Sign of a
Predicted E-Book Price War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/12/24/technology/e-book-price-war-has-yet-to-arrive.html?pagewanted=all (“Right
about now, just as millions of e-readers and tablets are being slipped under Christmas trees, there
was supposed to be a ferocious price war over e-books. . . . But doomsday has not arrived, at least
not yet.”).
198. Id. (“As four of the publishers have entered into settlements with regulators and revised
the way they sell e-books, prices have selectively fallen but not as broadly or drastically as
anticipated. . . . Amazon, for instance, is selling Michael Connelly’s new mystery, “The Black
Box,” for $12.74. New best sellers by David Baldacci and James Patterson cost just over $11.”);
Laura Hazard Owen, Free is Not the Magic Number: New Trends in eBook Pricing, GIGAOM
(May 30, 2013, 11:49 AM), http://gigaom.com/2013/05/30/free-is-not-the-magic-number-new-
trends-in-ebook-pricing/ (“Following big publishers’ settlements with the Department of Justice in
the ebook pricing case, the prices of their ebooks have settled as well—‘slightly north of pre-
agency’ prices, Tamblyn said.”) (quoting Michael Tamblyn, Kobo’s chief content officer); Joe
Nocera, Amazon’s ‘Bullying’ Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2014, at A19, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/05/31/opinion/nocera-amazons-bullying-tactics.html (noting that after the
settlements, “Amazon has not entirely reverted back to $9.99 e-books”). But see Bill Baer, Ass’t
Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in the
United States: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to European Competition Forum 2014, at 8 (Feb.
11, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/303686.pdf (“In the months
since the conspiracy was halted and competition restored, the average price of the top 25 best-
selling e-books dropped to around $6.47.”).
199. Streitfeld, supra note 197 (“‘The pricing war hasn’t happened because Amazon can’t
afford it,’ said Nate Hoffelder of the Digital Reader, a site devoted to e-book news and opinion.
‘The money Amazon lost on e-book discounts in 2008, 2009 was covered, at least in part, by the
high price of Kindle hardware,’ he said. ‘Now that the Kindle is being sold so cheap, Amazon no
longer has the hardware income to act as a cushion.’ . . . When the Kindle made its debut it was a
big hit at $399. The cheapest model is now $69. Barnes & Noble is selling its cheapest Nook for
$79, discounted from $99.”).
200. See Nocera, supra note 198, at A19 (“But its goal is not to raise prices, which is contrary
to Amazon’s pro-consumer culture.”).
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cially supported by its conspiracy with the publishers, it has remained in
the market after the collusion ended and Amazon regained its pricing
freedom. Microsoft entered indirectly by investing $300 million in
Barnes & Noble.201 This partnership promised to strengthen both firms
as competitors in the e-book market, giving Barnes & Noble additional
capital for its Nook division and allowing Microsoft to offer Barnes &
Noble’s library of e-books on its own tablet.202 Two other large firms,
Google and Sony, also moved into the e-books market,203 and a smaller
firm, Kobo, sells e-books in a consortium with the American Booksell-
ers Association, the trade group of independent brick-and-mortar book-
stores.204 Because of the presence of so many significant firms in the e-
books market,205 some of which entered when Amazon was charging
$9.99,206 it is unlikely that Amazon’s low pricing has created a danger-
201. Opinion & Order, supra note 4, at 38 (“Barnes & Noble was able to attract a $300 million
investment from Microsoft in order to compete with Amazon even after the filing of the proposed
Final Judgment shed doubt on the future of e-books agency pricing . . . .”).
202. See Response of Plaintiff United States to Public Comments on the Proposed Final
Judgment, supra note 5, at 6 (“According to public reports, Microsoft has invested hundreds of
millions of dollars in Barnes & Noble’s digital book business, a business that Microsoft valued at
$1.7 billion. Microsoft soon thereafter announced it would sell a tablet computer, named Surface,
that will compete against the iPad and serve as an e-reader.”); Ingrid Lunden, Microsoft Makes
$300M Investment in New Barnes & Noble Subsidiary to Battle with Amazon and Apple in E-
Books, TECH CRUNCH (Apr. 30, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/04/30/microsoft-barnes-noble-
partner-up-to-do-battle-with-amazon-and-apple-in-e-books (“‘One of the first benefits for
customers will be a NOOK application for Windows 8, which will extend the reach of Barnes &
Noble’s digital bookstore by providing one of the world’s largest digital catalogues of e-Books,
magazines and newspapers to hundreds of millions of Windows customers in the U.S. and
internationally.’”) (quoting joint press release of Barnes & Noble and Microsoft).
203. See Response of Plaintiff United States to Public Comments on the Proposed Final
Judgment, supra note 5, at 6 (“Google, already an e-book content provider, also announced after
the settlement that it would for the first time sell a tablet, called Nexus 7. The Nexus 7 is designed
to compete directly against Amazon’s Kindle Fire and bring more business to Google Play,
Google’s online store that sells e-books and other digital content.”); Reply Memorandum in
Support of the United States’ Motion for Entry of Final Judgment at 8, United States v. Apple,
Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-cv-2826) (referring to “Sony’s release of a
new e-reader”). But see L. Gordon Crovitz, The Antitrust Book Boomerang, WALL ST. J., June 2,
2014, at A13, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/gordon-crovitz-the-antitrust-book-
boomerang-1401661151 (noting that Sony and Samsung have now exited the e-reader market).
204. Yvonne Zipp, The Novel Resurgence of Independent Bookstores, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Mar. 17, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2013/0317/The-novel-
resurgence-of-independent-bookstores (“In November, Kobo, a Toronto-based e-reading
company, partnered with the ABA to sell e-readers and e-books at independent stores. So far,
about 450 have signed on.”).
205. See Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Amazon Struggles to Crack Publishing, WALL ST. J., Oct.
18, 2012, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100008723963904445927045
78062631678116120 (“Amazon, Barnes & Noble, Apple, Google and Sony are now competing to
sell both e-books and digital devices such as e-readers and tablets.”).
206. See Opinion & Order, supra note 4, at 38 (noting that “Barnes & Noble and Google had
either entered or planned to enter the e-books market well before the Agency Agreements were
signed”).
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ous probability of monopolization. The new entrants have substantially
reduced Amazon’s share207 and would be poised to take even more busi-
ness should Amazon ever attempt to charge monopoly prices.208 More-
over, in an adjacent market, the retail sale of print books, independent
bookstores have undergone a minor resurgence.209
In sum, considerable evidence suggests that Amazon was engaged
in loss leading, not predatory pricing. To be sure, loss leading may
sometimes be anticompetitive. Persistent loss leading may drive out
small firms with limited product lines,210 and their demise could harm
some consumers if those firms offered distinctive services that the mar-
ket was unlikely to replace. But that concern was minimal here since
most of Amazon’s rivals were large and sold e-readers as well as e-
books. As a result, Amazon was almost certainly using loss leading not
as a predatory device but as an efficient promotional tool, drawing con-
sumers to its website to buy products they might not otherwise
purchase.211 Thus, the publishers could not defend their conspiracy by
207. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
208. Barnes & Noble, of course, has been losing money in its attempts to develop new e-
readers. See Joshua Brustein, Barnes & Noble Won’t Stop Making New Money-Losing Nooks,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-02-26/
barnes-and-noble-wont-stop-making-new-money-losing-nooks. But, despite its struggles, Barnes
& Noble remains a substantial presence in the e-books market. See Bosman, supra note 72
(according to the chain’s executives, its market share is now twenty percent).
209. See Zipp, supra note 204 (describing a “quiet resurgence of independent bookstores”); see
also id. (“Sales at independent bookstores rose about 8 percent in 2012 over 2011, according to a
survey by the American Booksellers Association (ABA). . . . ‘I think the worst days of
independents are behind them,’ says Jim Milliot, coeditorial director for Publishers Weekly
magazine.”); see also id. (“In 2009, the low point for its membership, the ABA had 1,401
members with 1,651 locations across the United States. Since then, the ABA has seen three
straight years of growth. As of May 2012, it had 1,567 members with 1,900 locations.”).
More recently, Jennifer Enderlin, the publisher of St. Martin’s Press Paperbacks and Griffin,
commented: “‘Independents seem to be having a good run right now . . . . They’re having a nice
renaissance.’” Julie Bosman, Booksellers Wary About Holiday Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2013,
at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/16/business/booksellers-wary-about-holiday-
sales.html?pagewanted=all. The threat to independents from e-books was receding because e-book
sales had stopped growing. See id. (“The Association of American Publishers, which collects
monthly data from about 1,200 publishers, said last month that e-book sales had been flat or in
decline for most of 2013.”). Enderlin thought e-book sales were finding their own level and would
“‘start affecting print books in a good way.’” Id.
210. See Shaun D. Ledgerwood & Wesley J. Heath, Rummaging Through the Bottom of
Pandora’s Box: Funding Predatory Pricing Through Contemporaneous Recoupment, 6 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 509, 540 (2012) (noting that a small firm with a limited product line, and no other
means of responding to loss leading by a larger rival, would “face the choice of perpetually
absorbing losses or shutting down for an indeterminate period of time”); Albert A. Foer & Tyler
Patterson, E-books and Amazon: The Need to Hear Two Hands Clapping, COMPETITION. L.
INSIGHT, July 31, 2012, at 8, 9 (“[T]he multiproduct distributor’s ability to cross-subsidize
particular products by below-cost sales will drive out single-product firms.”).
211. Ledgerwood and Heath argue that loss leading is harmful, despite its promotional value to
consumers—a benefit they describe as “large”—because loss leading reduces allocative
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pointing to Amazon’s below-cost prices. Those prices were much more
likely to be beneficial to consumers than predatory. But even if they had
been predatory, Amazon’s behavior would not have justified collusion.
2. INCORRECT AS A POLICY MATTER
Suppose that Amazon was engaged in an unmistakable case of
predatory pricing, selling e-books below their incremental cost with the
goal—and the prospect—of securing monopoly power in the e-books
market. Would that behavior warrant the publishers’ collusion? Judge
Cote said no. Upholding the Justice Department’s original settlements,
she stated: “[E]ven if Amazon was engaged in predatory pricing, this is
no excuse for unlawful price-fixing. . . . The familiar mantra regarding
‘two wrongs’ would seem to offer guidance in these circumstances.”212
Later, in her decision finding Apple liable, she was even more emphatic:
If Apple is suggesting that Amazon was engaging in illegal, monopo-
listic practices, and that Apple’s combination with the Publisher
Defendants to deprive a monopolist of some of its market power is
pro-competitive and healthy for our economy, it is wrong. This trial
has not been the occasion to decide whether Amazon’s choice to sell
NYT Bestsellers or other New Releases as loss leaders was an unfair
trade practice or in any other way a violation of law. If it was, how-
ever, the remedy for illegal conduct is a complaint lodged with the
proper law enforcement offices or a civil suit or both. Another com-
pany’s alleged violation of antitrust laws is not an excuse for engag-
ing in your own violations of law.213
Judge Cote’s conclusion echoes Supreme Court precedent.214 It is
efficiency. Ledgerwood & Heath, supra note 210, at 540–41. They note, using a simple welfare
model, that if a firm sells a product for less than its marginal cost, it produces an inefficiently
large quantity of the product, lowering allocative efficiency. See id. at 536–38. But allocative
efficiency is not all that matters for total welfare or consumer welfare. Productive efficiency also
counts. And loss leading is likely to increase productive efficiency because a profit-maximizing
firm would not ordinarily choose it unless it were cheaper or more effective than other
promotional devices. If loss leading were banned, therefore, retailers would find it harder or more
expensive to promote their products, which could reduce both consumer welfare and total welfare.
In the terms that Ledgerwood and Heath use, the promotional value of loss leading is likely to
outweigh its adverse impact on allocative efficiency.
Areeda and Hovenkamp assert, moreover, that “no one has yet adduced any empirical
evidence that the hypothesized evils of loss-leader selling occur with any frequency. Vague
complaints of ‘unfair loss-leader tactics’ are much more common than actual examples of
consumer acceptance being destroyed, rival dealers ruined, or manufacturers prejudiced.” 8
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1619, at 206 (2d ed. 2004); see
also id. ¶ 1633d (rejecting loss leading as a justification for resale price maintenance, at least
presumptively).
212. Opinion & Order, supra note 4, at 40.
213. United States v. Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
214. See FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 457, 465 (1986) (“That a particular
practice may be unlawful is not, in itself, a sufficient justification for collusion among competitors
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also correct as a matter of antitrust policy, at least where two conditions
hold: (1) the customer’s behavior is a clear violation of existing law, and
(2) the colluding suppliers would enhance their downstream market
power by colluding. The first condition implies that a lawsuit, by a gov-
ernment or private plaintiff, is very likely to stop the customer’s behav-
ior. The second indicates that collusion is likely to do more harm than
good. While it may halt the customer’s anticompetitive conduct, it
would also, by increasing downstream market power, enable the col-
luders to exploit ultimate consumers. Where both conditions hold, a law-
suit is plainly preferable to collusion.
Suppose, however, that the customer’s conduct was not clearly ille-
gal—that it was likely to be anticompetitive but unlikely to violate
existing law. This is a real possibility in the area of predatory pricing,
where many scholars maintain that prevailing law, which requires
below-cost pricing,215 is too restrictive. As they explain, it is quite possi-
ble for a dominant firm to use aggressive price cutting to exclude
entrants and harm consumers without incurring losses.216 In such cases,
collusion to control a customer’s conduct could compensate for a gap in
the law and produce a procompetitive result. But if the customer’s con-
duct was truly predatory, it would produce supracompetitive profits for
the customer, and the suppliers would frequently want to share in those
profits. In many cases, in other words, the profit-maximizing outcome
for the suppliers would not be to prevent the achievement of down-
stream market power but to exploit it themselves.217 In these cases, col-
lusion by the suppliers would not benefit consumers and may well make
to prevent it.”); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941)
(“[E]ven if copying [original fashion designs] were an acknowledged tort under the law of every
state, that situation would not justify petitioners in combining together to regulate and restrain
interstate commerce in violation of federal law.”).
215. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic
Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 591 (1994); Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H.
Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2271 (2000);
Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941, 944 (2002); John B.
Kirkwood, Controlling Above-Cost Predation: An Alternative to Weyerhaeuser and Brooke
Group, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 369, 382–86 (2008).
217. See infra note 274 (explaining that the existence of downstream market power changes
the profit-maximizing outcome for the upstream suppliers, inducing them to restrict rather than
increase output). That would not be the case where the suppliers, through effective tacit
coordination, already exert all the market power available in their vertical channel. In such a case,
the suppliers would have no interest in seeing a customer increase its own market power
downstream, since that would result in double marginalization. But in the more usual case, in
which competition among the suppliers prevents them from capturing all the available market
power, they would have an interest in seeing their customer capture unexploited power, provided
they share in it. They would have an even greater interest in exercising all of this power
themselves, and they may be able to do so if they are allowed to collude.
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them worse off. Thus, even if a powerful customer is engaged in
anticompetitive but not illegal predation, it is wise policy to preclude the
suppliers from colluding in response.
The policy issues are more difficult when the problem is not a dom-
inant customer’s resort to predatory pricing, but its exercise of buying
power. Unlike predatory pricing, which antitrust law attempts to control,
albeit imperfectly, the exercise of buyer power is subject to little or no
constraint. While exclusionary conduct that creates or maintains monop-
sony power may violate the antitrust laws,218 the exploitation of existing
buyer power is generally not prohibited.219 Thus, when a powerful buyer
has acquired and maintained its power legally, suppliers facing that
buyer cannot be told to control that buyer by bringing an antitrust law-
suit challenging its exploitation of that power. Collusion may be the
only remedy. Part V explores whether and when it might be a desirable
remedy. The next section addresses the remaining issue of Part IV—
whether Amazon’s buyer power provided a justification for the publish-
ers’ collusion.
C. Countervailing Power
When Amazon exerts buying power, it wields countervailing
power, not monopsony power. But the exercise of countervailing power
can be anticompetitive. Section 1 recounts why so many in the indus-
try—publishers, authors, and rival booksellers—were concerned about
Amazon’s exercise of countervailing power. Section 2 evaluates whether
Amazon’s behavior actually resulted in consumer harm or posed a suffi-
cient risk of it that the e-books conspiracy was warranted.
1. EXISTENCE AND POTENTIAL ADVERSE EFFECTS
Amazon’s dominant position at the time of the publishers’ conspir-
acy suggested it could exert considerable countervailing power. Its share
218. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 315
(2007) (indicating that a large buyer that acquires monopsony power through predatory bidding
may violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act).
219. A possible exception is section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13(f)
(2012). A large buyer may violate section 2(f) if it uses its countervailing power to induce a
supplier to grant it a price concession that is not made available to competing buyers. It is
difficult, however, to bring a successful suit under section 2(f) because the plaintiff must show
that the buyer knew, or should have known, that the concession it induced was illegal. Because
powerful buyers often obtain concessions by requiring suppliers to compete for their business, and
a concession given to meet competition is not illegal, a powerful buyer frequently has a good faith
belief that the concession it obtained was legal. See John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and
Exclusionary Conduct: Should Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price
Discrimination and Predatory Bidding?, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 625, 629 n.7 (2005). The publishers
could not realistically control Amazon’s buying power through section 2(f).
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of e-book sales was a striking ninety percent.220 Moreover, it had repeat-
edly utilized the leverage this share conferred, refusing to deal with pub-
lishers that failed to bend to its demands and depriving them, while the
cut off lasted, of a very large portion of their expected e-book reve-
nues.221 As Apple’s counsel put it, Amazon’s large share makes it “an
essential partner to any publisher, and, as a result, it has significant
leverage to dictate terms in its negotiations. And when publishers resist,
Amazon makes them pay.”222 Writing for the New York Times, David
Carr agreed: “Amazon has used its market power to bully and
dictate.”223
In early 2012, for example, Amazon’s contract with the Indepen-
dent Publishers Group (“IPG”) came up for renewal and Amazon
pressed IPG for better terms. When it resisted, Amazon removed the buy
buttons from almost 5,000 IPG e-books.224 And Amazon continued to
refuse to sell IPG e-books for three months, until IPG came to terms.225
In one instance, Amazon turned off the buy buttons for the titles of a
British publisher for more than a year.226 And, in the most dramatic
example, Amazon removed the buy buttons on all of Macmillan’s titles,
e-book and print, when the publisher demanded that Amazon move to
the agency model.227 Amazon soon capitulated, of course, when it
learned that several other publishers would insist on the same model,228
but this episode showed that Amazon felt it had enough buying power to
cut off one of America’s leading publishers.
The publishers feared that, unless Amazon’s buying power were
220. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. In addition, Amazon had a significant share
of total trade book sales. As of April 2012, its share was estimated at twenty to twenty-five
percent. See Amy Martinez, Amazon.com Trying to Wring Deep Discounts from Publishers,
SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 2, 2012), http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2017889
877_amazonpublisher02.html. In the last two years, that share has grown. See Packer, supra note
33 (“Amazon constitutes a third of one major house’s retail sales on a given week . . . .”); Nocera,
supra note 198 (“Publishers Weekly reports that in March, Amazon commanded 41 percent of all
new books sold . . . .”).
221. See infra notes 224–28 and accompanying text.
222. Apple Inc.’s Tunney Act Comment, supra note 6, at 7–8.
223. Carr, supra note 8.
224. Id.
225. Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Amazon, Publisher Settle Digital Books Dispute, WALL ST. J.
(May 25, 2012, 6:53 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304840904577
426830792316616.
226. Comments of The Authors Guild, supra note 7, at 3 (“Amazon has continuously used its
market leverage, in the U.S. and abroad, to dictate terms to its suppliers by removing buy buttons,
in at least one instance punishing a recalcitrant British publisher for more than a year . . . .”); see
also id. at 5 (noting that Amazon also removed “buy buttons in the United Kingdom from
hundreds of Bloomsbury titles while in negotiations with the publisher”).
227. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
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controlled, it would only grow, threatening to reduce the revenues and
profits of the publishers even more. This fear was plausible for two rea-
sons. First, when Amazon uses its buying power to obtain a lower price,
it gains an advantage over less powerful retailers like independent book-
sellers, and it can use that advantage to outcompete them in the market-
place, raising its market share and increasing its buying power still
further, putting itself in a position to extract even lower prices. Buyer
power, in short, can create a self-reinforcing cycle. Second, as noted
earlier, publishers’ marginal costs are typically low and flat.229 As a
result, they remain vulnerable to the exercise of buying power so long as
their prices remain above marginal cost.230 It is no surprise, then, that
Steve Jobs warned HarperCollins that if it did not control Amazon’s
pricing and growth, Amazon would soon be telling the publisher that it
would no longer be paying it as much.231
Amazon’s buying power troubled the publishers because of its
direct threat to their profits. But it also concerned them—and other
industry observers—because of its potential threat to a vibrant and
diverse book publishing industry. The central concern was that Ama-
zon’s growing exercise of its power as a buyer would ultimately result in
229. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
230. They remain vulnerable because, if a large buyer credibly threatens them with a choice
between either doing no business at all with that buyer or doing significant business at a lower
price, they will choose the lower price, so long as it is above marginal cost, since that is the more
profitable option. For this reason, Epstein states: “But the marginal price for the production of an
additional eBook is close to zero, so the retailers know that if they pay very little under this model
the publishers will have no choice but to go along with the low prices.” Epstein, supra note 9. Of
course, publishers have some leverage too, both because they offer titles that no other publisher
offers and because, if they are forced to price too low, they will be unable to cover their fixed
costs and may curtail their development of new titles or even exit. As a result, it is unlikely that
Amazon could or would force publishers to price at or very close to marginal cost. But the point is
still valid: the publishers are more vulnerable to buyer power than they would otherwise be
because they normally price substantially above marginal cost, enabling them to grant a price
concession and still maintain a positive margin.
231. In an email to James Murdoch of News Corp, the parent of HarperCollins (“HC”), Steve
Jobs wrote:
As I see it, HC has the following choices:
1. Throw in with apple and see if we call all make a go of this to create a real
mainstream ebooks market at $12.99 and $14.99.
2. Keep going with Amazon at $9.99. You will make a bit more money in the short
term, but in the medium term Amazon will tell you they will be paying you 70% of
$9.99. They have shareholders too.
Quoted in United States v. Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (omitting the third
choice). Like many other powerful buyers, Amazon has asked publishers for a variety of different
concessions, not just price cuts. See Packer, supra note 33 (describing Amazon’s demands for
“ever larger co-op fees[,] . . . better shipping terms,” and substantial “‘marketing development
funds’”).
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a decline in the number and variety of titles produced by the industry.232
This reduction in consumer choice could occur through three distinct
routes. First, by forcing publishers to accept less money for their books,
Amazon’s buying power would reduce the profitability of book publish-
ing, which could cause publishers to develop fewer new titles and take
fewer risks, concentrating on proven authors and formats and experi-
menting less with new writers or approaches.233 Second, if Amazon pays
less for books, authors will also suffer, and the decline in their royalties
may reduce the number and quality of new titles they produce.234 Third,
Amazon’s buying power threatens the viability of independent book-
stores, since they are in no position to negotiate comparable discounts,
and their decline would make it harder for consumers to discover new
titles.235 Brick-and-mortar retailers, both independents and chains, pro-
vide a convenient and comfortable space in which consumers can
inspect and sample new books.236 If the number of physical bookstores
dropped sharply, there would be “‘a lot less space devoted to showcas-
ing a large number of titles,’” according to an independent bookseller in
Seattle.237
232. As Packer put it, “the big question is not just whether Amazon is bad for the book
industry; it’s whether Amazon is bad for books.” Packer, supra note 33.
233. One might ask why Amazon would want to curtail the development of new titles, since
that would reduce Amazon’s sales in the future. There are two possible answers. One is that
Amazon is more concerned with the near term than the long term, interested in achieving strong
current profits even if that has some adverse impact on its future results. Second, consumers can
easily tell when they are getting a good price from Amazon, but they cannot easily judge whether
the array of titles has been restricted. Price is both more salient for consumers and more readily
evaluated than the extent of variety, so long as significant variety remains. Both factors may cause
Amazon to press for price cuts even if that results in less innovation in the long run. On the other
hand, Amazon would not want to suffer a substantial reduction in its future sales. As a result, its
willingness to demand concessions from publishers would always be limited.
234. See Epstein, supra note 9 (“[L]ower royalties translate into lower level of production of
new books . . . . It is plausible that . . . higher royalties increase the number of titles
available . . . .”).
235. Although the number of independents has risen recently, see supra note 204, during the
prior two decades, their ranks were decimated. See Kirkwood, supra note 27, at 1510 n.103
(noting that the membership of the American Booksellers Association fell from a high of 5,200 in
1991 to 1,791 in 2005).
236. See Letter from Scott Turow, supra note 11:
Marketing studies consistently show that readers are far more adventurous in their
choice of books when in a bookstore than when shopping online. In bookstores,
readers are open to trying new genres and new authors: it’s by far the best way for
new works to be discovered. . . . A robust book marketplace demands both
bookstore showrooms to properly display new titles and online distribution for the
convenience of customers.
Indeed, the demise of Borders unexpectedly illustrated this phenomenon. See Streitfeld, supra
note 181. (“When Borders collapsed two years ago, analysts said there was an unexpected
consequence to the loss of 400 stores: the e-book growth rate began to taper off, as readers could
no longer examine new titles before ordering them from Amazon.”).
237. Streitfeld, supra note 181 (quoting J. B. Dickey, owner of the Seattle Mystery Bookshop).
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These concerns helped motivate the publishers’ decision to impose
an agency model on Amazon and force it to raise its retail prices. As
Judge Cote found, the publishers were upset by Amazon’s $9.99 price
for e-books primarily because it undermined their ability to charge much
higher prices for new hardcover titles.238 But they also believed it
threatened “the viability of the brick-and-mortar stores in which
hardcover books were displayed and sold.”239 And they “feared Ama-
zon’s growing power in the book distribution business. They were con-
cerned that, should Amazon continue to dominate the sale of e-books to
consumers, it would start to demand even lower wholesale prices for e-
books . . . .”240 The resulting conspiracy enabled the publishers to deal
with these fears. By forcing Amazon to charge more for bestselling and
newly released e-books, they encouraged Apple’s entry and Barnes &
Noble’s growth, both of which reduced Amazon’s market share and its
leverage as a buyer. Moreover, by raising the retail price of e-books, the
publishers curbed Amazon’s threat to brick-and-mortar retailers. But it is
difficult to conclude that the publishers’ conspiracy was justified.
2. INADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION
While there were plenty of reasons to be concerned about the
impact of Amazon’s countervailing power on consumer choice, no
one—not the publishers themselves, nor the Authors Guild, Apple,
Barnes & Noble, independent booksellers, or other critics of the e-books
case—submitted evidence that Amazon’s leverage as a buyer had actu-
ally caused a reduction in the number, diversity, or quality of titles pub-
lished. On the contrary, there was unmistakable evidence that Amazon’s
introduction of the Kindle, and the other e-readers that soon followed,
had resulted in an explosion of e-book titles.241 As a result, the conces-
sions Amazon induced were more likely to have been procompetitive,
enabling Amazon to lower prices to consumers without significantly
reducing choice. Indeed, in The Everything Store, Brad Stone writes that
Amazon habitually passes concessions on to consumers: “The publishers
had seen over many years what Amazon did with . . . [its] additional
leverage. It exacted more concessions and passed the savings on to cus-
tomers in the form of lower prices and shipping discounts . . . .”242
238. See supra note 94.
239. United States v. Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
240. Id.
241. See supra note 78.
242. STONE, supra note 1, at 256; see also id. at 278 (“As suppliers had learned over the past
decade, no matter the category, Amazon wielded its market power neither lightly nor gracefully,
employing every bit of leverage to improve its own margins and pass along savings to its
customers.”).
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Amazon’s countervailing power, moreover, was not unlimited. It
had cut off—and brought to terms—the Independent Publishers Groups
and some smaller publishers here and in the United Kingdom.243 But its
refusal to deal with Macmillan was short-lived and unsuccessful,244 and
it had not attempted to cut off any large publisher like Random House or
Simon & Schuster. To be sure, its inability to force Macmillan to back
down was due to Macmillan’s agreement with the other conspirators.
Had Macmillan been acting alone, Amazon almost certainly would have
been able to get its way. But it was unclear whether Amazon could wield
comparable power against the largest publishers.
Amazon’s market share, moreover, was eroding. Barnes & Noble
entered before the conspiracy began, and Microsoft and Google entered
soon after it ended.245 Amazon now has to face Apple, Barnes & Noble,
Google, Kobo, and Microsoft,246 leading one observer to characterize
the e-books market as “ultracompetitive.”247 The presence of all these
rivals gives the publishers numerous alternatives to Amazon. Further,
independent bookstores are growing again,248 mitigating, for a time at
least, the concern that Amazon will destroy this important channel for
the presentation and distribution of print books. As noted earlier, more-
over, Amazon itself would not want to cause a major reduction in the
availability of new titles, since that would produce an unacceptable
reduction in its future sales.
In sum, neither the critics of the e-books case nor the publishers
could make a compelling case that unless Amazon’s countervailing
power were controlled, consumer choice would suffer materially, either
When Amazon obtains a concession from a publisher, there are only three possibilities. First,
the concession is cost justified. That is, it reflects cost savings the publisher realizes in selling
large volumes to Amazon. If so, the publisher can grant the concession—and Amazon can pass it
on to consumers—without reducing the profits the publisher would have earned if it had sold the
same books to smaller buyers. Second, the concession causes a reduction in the publisher’s
supracompetitive profits. A publisher may earn supracompetitive profits because of oligopolistic
coordination with other publishers or because some of its titles are exceptionally popular. If so, the
publisher can grant the concession—and Amazon can pass it on—without depriving the publisher
of a competitive return on innovation. Third, the concession reduces the publisher’s profits below
the competitive level, diminishing its incentive and ability to innovate. In this case, Amazon can
pass the concession onto consumers, but it would hurt them in the long term because of a decline
in the number or quality of new titles. Only the third possibility would reduce innovation. While
none of the three can be ruled out without more information, the third possibility seems the least
likely for the reasons noted in the text.
243. See supra notes 224–26 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 227–28 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 201–03.
246. See supra notes 203–05.
247. Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, New Barnes CEO Must Analyze Nook, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9.
2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB20001424052702303848104579308291857560248.
248. See supra note 209.
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in the short term or the foreseeable future.249 While Amazon’s substan-
tial market share and relentless demands for concessions made it impos-
sible to rule out future effects, their likelihood was not great enough to
warrant a conspiracy that imposed immediate and substantial price
increases on consumers. In the e-books case, in short, Amazon’s buyer
power did not justify collusion.
In other cases, however, collusion to control a powerful customer
may be warranted. To help identify the necessary circumstances, Part V
begins by highlighting the principal reasons why the collusion in the e-
books case was properly condemned.
V. LIMITED DEFENSE FOR COLLUSION TO CONTROL BUYER POWER
The e-books conspiracy was unwarranted for three main reasons.
First, though Amazon is a powerful buyer, it lacked the traditional and
most dangerous type of buyer power—monopsony power. Had Amazon
possessed such power, predictable anticompetitive consequences would
have followed and collusion to reverse those consequences might have
been desirable. Second, while Amazon does possess the other type of
buyer power—countervailing power—no one showed that it had caused
harm to innovation, diversity, or choice. Because the exercise of coun-
tervailing power is frequently procompetitive, collusion should not be
allowed to offset it unless there is clear evidence of competitive harm.
Finally, by colluding, the publishers and Apple acquired downstream
market power. That normally, if not always, renders upstream collusion
impermissible, because it gives the colluders the ability and the incen-
tive to exploit consumers.
In short, the absence of monopsony power, the lack of demonstra-
ble harm from the exercise of countervailing power, and the creation of
downstream market power rendered the e-books collusion unacceptable.
If two of these factors had been reversed—the third and either of the
first two—a defense for supplier collusion to counteract buyer power
might have been appropriate. The following sections develop such a
defense. It is not designed to capture every situation in which collusion
to control a powerful customer would be desirable, since such a defense
might be asserted too frequently and be too hard to resolve. To reduce
these concerns, the elements of the defense have been narrowed and
249. See Foer & Patterson, supra note 210, at 10 (“[W]e do not at this point in time have
evidence of monopsonistic abuse or even a dangerous probability of it.”); see also Packer, supra
note 33 (describing the growing dependence of publishers on Amazon and the increasing
concessions it demands, but also noting the huge selection of books it has made available to
consumers at low prices). “Amazon has made it possible for hundreds of thousands of writers
frustrated with the limits of traditional publishing to have their work read.” Packer, supra note 33.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-1\MIA101.txt unknown Seq: 52  5-DEC-14 11:32
52 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1
simplified to reach only the clearest cases of procompetitive collusion.
As a result, the defense would be very difficult to establish. When it
could be established, however, consumers, competition, and efficiency
would benefit.
The proposed defense would have three elements. First, colluding
suppliers would have to show that their customer had buyer power—
either monopsony power or countervailing power. In addition, the sup-
pliers would have to show that this power, of whatever type, was legally
acquired, substantial, persistent, and durable. Second, the suppliers must
demonstrate that their collusion, by offsetting such power, likely
enhanced downstream competition. That is, they must show that it likely
increased output, lowered downstream prices, widened consumer choice,
or otherwise benefited consumers.250 If the buyer had monopsony
power, an increase in output could be inferred, rather than affirmatively
demonstrated. If the buyer had countervailing power, however, the sup-
pliers would have to demonstrate that the customer’s exercise of such
power had curbed innovation in the past and that collusion was likely to
increase it. Third, the suppliers must show that their collusion did not
create downstream market power.
A. Buyer Power
The first element requires the suppliers to show that their largest
customer possessed either monopsony power or countervailing power.251
In addition, to exclude cases in which such power ought not to be
counteracted by collusion—because it was based on illegal conduct, was
modest, was a reward for superior performance, or would disappear on
its own—the suppliers must also prove that the customer’s power met
four requirements: it was legally acquired, substantial, persistent, and
durable.
1. EXISTENCE OF BUYER POWER
Suppliers must prove that their customer possessed either monop-
sony power or countervailing power.
i. Monopsony Power
To establish that a customer had monopsony power, the suppliers
250. In cases of monopsony power, the suppliers’ collusion would also protect themselves
from exploitation, a basic goal of antitrust in buy-side cases. See supra note 164.
251. To keep the defense narrow and targeted at the worst instances of buyer power, it should
be limited to cases in which a single large customer, acting unilaterally, possessed monopsony
power or countervailing power. If the market contained other customers, colluding suppliers could
not take advantage of them. To the contrary, they would be ineligible for the defense if they
offered the smaller customers less favorable terms than they offered the largest customer.
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must show that, in the absence of collusion, they were vulnerable to the
exercise of monopsony power. This means that, acting individually, they
lacked market power and operated on an upward-sloping marginal cost
curve. In addition, the customer must possess the unilateral power to
profitably depress the price it pays them below the competitive level.
That is, it can lower the price below the competitive level without caus-
ing so many suppliers to turn to other customers or withhold supply
altogether that the price reduction is unprofitable.252 In short, the
upstream market must be consistent with the textbook monopsony
model.
ii. Countervailing Power
If the suppliers assert that their customer possessed the more com-
mon form of buyer power—countervailing power—they must establish
that they were vulnerable, in the absence of collusion, to the exercise of
this type of power. This requires showing that they possessed market
power, that the customer could play them off against each other or other-
wise exert leverage over them, and that, as a result, they could be
induced to grant a lower price or more favorable non-price terms to the
customer. Although suppliers can have market power—and be vulnera-
ble to the exercise of countervailing power—even if their marginal costs
are rising, suppliers with market power (like the book publishers) usu-
ally have constant marginal costs over the pertinent range of output,
making it easier for the customer to use its leverage to induce a price cut
or other concession from them.253
2. CHARACTERISTICS
In addition to establishing that the customer had buying power, the
suppliers must show that this power was legally acquired, substantial,
persistent, and durable.
i. Legally Acquired
Suppliers must establish that their customer had acquired or pre-
served its buying power through legal means rather than anticompetitive
conduct. Legal means might involve procompetitive conduct like inno-
vation or structural factors like economies of scale or government regu-
252. The suppliers may be able to establish the customer’s monopsony power through direct
evidence. For example, they may be able to show that market output and prices are below the
competitive level or, in a more extreme case, that the customer had so much monopsony power
that it was able to engage in all-or-nothing contracting, forcing prices down to the level of each
supplier’s average total costs. For a more detailed discussion of the requirements and effects of
monopsony power, see Kirkwood, supra note 27, at 1495–1500.
253. For a more detailed analysis of countervailing power, see id. at 1500–12.
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lation, but the precise means are less important than what the suppliers
must be able to disprove—that their customer’s power was attributable
to anticompetitive behavior. For as Judge Cote stressed in her e-books
decision, where customer power is dependent on anticompetitive behav-
ior, the preferable remedy is not collusion to combat the power but an
antitrust lawsuit to combat the behavior.254 Of course, not every lawsuit
is successful, either in establishing liability or achieving effective relief.
But suppliers should not be entitled to collude when anticompetitive
behavior was responsible for their customer’s buying power and an anti-
trust challenge to that behavior was reasonably likely to produce mean-
ingful relief.255
ii. Substantial
Like the market power of a seller, the power of a buyer, whether
monopsony power or countervailing power, is a matter of degree, and
relatively small degrees of buyer power should not justify collusion.
Collusion is too dangerous to allow when buyer power is modest. As
Hovenkamp noted, moreover, if any amount of buyer power is sufficient
to excuse a supplier conspiracy, suppliers caught colluding will always
point to a customer with some power.256 For both reasons, the amount of
buyer power required to permit collusion should be substantial. To make
this concrete, suppliers should ordinarily have to show a market share, in
a relevant purchasing market, of at least seventy percent in the case of
monopsony power and forty percent in the case of countervailing power.
Market share alone, of course, does not establish power; colluding sup-
pliers would have to demonstrate, using whatever evidence suffices, that
they faced a customer that actually possessed monopsony power or
countervailing power. But the level of power required should be consid-
erable, and these market share thresholds suggest the magnitudes that
should be demanded.257
254. See supra notes 212–13 and accompanying text.
255. If the government opposes supplier collusion on this ground, it would have to explain why
it had not brought an action challenging the customer’s behavior.
256. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
257. It is quite possible for a buyer to exercise monopsony power or countervailing power with
a market share below these thresholds. See Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Power, Competition Policy,
and Antitrust: The Competitive Effects of Discrimination Among Suppliers, 53 ANTITRUST BULL.
271, 295 (2008) (stating that a “striking thing” about recent cases involving buyer power is “the
relatively modest market shares” required to exert such power); Kirkwood, supra note 27, at
1503–04 (citing the conclusions of numerous commentators that a buyer can wield significant
countervailing power with a market share of thirty percent or less); Maurice E. Stucke, Looking at
the Monopsony in the Mirror, 62 EMORY L.J. 1509, 1532 (2013) (describing as a “trap” the view
that a “50% market share is insufficient for monopsonization claims”). This is another way in
which the proposed defense is conservative, intended only to reach the clearest instances of
undesirable buyer power.
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iii. Persistent
A customer’s power should also be persistent and durable. The
durability requirement, discussed below, is intended to rule out cases in
which a customer’s power is unlikely to last. The persistence require-
ment is needed for a different purpose—to make sure that buyers that
attain a powerful position through superior efficiency, innovation, or
other procompetitive behavior receive an adequate reward for their
efforts. Some buyers that acquire power legally benefit from a combina-
tion of good fortune and competent performance. Others, however,
achieve their positions through expensive and risky investments that
result in better products or more efficient production. Those investments
might not be made if, whenever they paid off, colluding suppliers were
entitled to a share of the profits.
The issue could be addressed through a comprehensive, case-spe-
cific inquiry. Colluding suppliers could be required to identify every
procompetitive investment that had contributed substantially to their
customer’s buying power and show that the customer had already earned
profits sufficient to compensate it for the costs and risks it had incurred
in making each investment. Such a detailed inquiry, however, would
greatly, if not impossibly, complicate the litigation of a defense that
ought to be narrow and simple.258 A better approach would be to require
suppliers to identify the most recent procompetitive investment that con-
tributed substantially to the customer’s power and show that their collu-
sion had begun at least five years thereafter. Five years—the typical
planning horizon—provides a reasonable measure of the time needed to
provide a firm with substantial compensation for a procompetitive
investment.259
258. See Richard M. Brunell, Appropriability in Antitrust: How Much is Enough?, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 18 (2001) (“The difficulties of any case-by-case evaluation of the appropriate
reward for a particular investment are manifold.”).
259. If there is evidence that a longer period would be superior, it should be substituted. The
point is to provide an objective measure that can be used in litigation. The patent period is
considerably longer, of course, but when a patent expires, others are free to copy the patented
invention. Here, suppliers could not copy a customer’s invention after five years; they could only
collude to counteract the customer’s exercise of buyer power, which would limit—but not
eliminate—the future compensation it received for its investment.
Professor Wu recommends a similar rule of thumb—a persistence period of a few years—in
determining when to bring an enforcement action against a dominant firm. He writes:
If we are speaking of a rule of thumb I’d suggest the following: The monopolist
should be profitable before enforcement is countenanced. Waiting through a few
years of dominance is likely a good idea. But ultimately, once the monopolist has
earned back its investments, all talk of forbearance to preserve incentives to
innovate must come to an end.
Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement If Innovation Mattered Most, 78
ANTITRUST L.J. 313, 327–28 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-1\MIA101.txt unknown Seq: 56  5-DEC-14 11:32
56 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1
To illustrate the approach, recall that Amazon introduced the Kin-
dle, the first widely popular e-reader, in 2007, yet the publishers forced
the agency model on Amazon in 2010, just three years later. Because the
conspiracy occurred less than five years after this significant innovation,
the publishers would not be entitled to the proposed defense.
iv. Durable
Finally, colluding suppliers must prove that the customer’s power
was durable. If, instead, its power was likely to be eroded in the near
future by market forces, a price fixing conspiracy would not be war-
ranted.260 Suppliers should have to establish, therefore, not only that
they faced a customer with substantial, persistent, and legally acquired
buying power, but also that, at the time they began to collude, this power
was likely to last for the foreseeable future. In other words, there was no
good reason to expect that new entry, rival expansion, technological
change, or a shift in demand would undercut the customer’s power.261
B. Likely Procompetitive Effects
The second element of the defense requires the suppliers to show
that their collusion was likely to enhance downstream competition. That
is, that it was likely to increase downstream output, lower downstream
prices, enhance innovation, or otherwise benefit consumers.262 This ele-
ment can be inferred where the customer had monopsony power and the
suppliers establish the first and third elements of the defense. Where
these conditions are met, counteracting monopsony power is likely to be
procompetitive. If, however, the customer possessed countervailing
power, which is often procompetitive, offsetting such power may not be
desirable, even if the power meets the four prerequisites. As a result, the
suppliers would have to satisfy additional requirements.
260. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
261. In some cases the most likely source of new entry will be the suppliers themselves.
According to Professor Carstensen, before the advent of good roads and trucks, farmers needed to
sell their grain to very proximate elevators. And due to economies of scale, the nearby elevators
were often few in number, typically one or two, giving them significant monopsony power over
the local farmers. In response, the farmers frequently built their own elevators, increasing the
outlets for their grain and raising the prices they received. See Email from Peter C. Carstensen to
author (Dec. 19, 2013) (on file with author). This example underlines the point that collusion to
offset buyer power is warranted only when new entry—including new entry by the suppliers
themselves—is unlikely.
262. The collusion would of course benefit the suppliers. This benefit would have antitrust
value where the suppliers would otherwise be exploited by the unjustified exercise of monopsony
power. See supra note 164 (describing the fundamental goal of antitrust law in buy-side cases).
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1. MONOPSONY POWER
Counteracting monopsony power is likely to be desirable when the
monopsony power is legally acquired, substantial, durable, and persis-
tent. In such cases, there is no good reason to exempt the monopsony
power from the counteracting force of supplier collusion.263 Instead, the
exercise of such monopsony power depresses both the output produced
by suppliers and the price paid to them below the competitive level, and
injures the suppliers, economic efficiency, and downstream consum-
ers.264 In these circumstances, supplier collusion that limits the exercise
of monopsony power is likely to be procompetitive. As many scholars
have shown, when a monopsonist is confronted by a single supplier, the
two of them have a powerful incentive to increase output since their
joint profits are maximized at the competitive level of output, not the
monopsony level.265 While they may not achieve this optimal level, due
to imperfections in the bargaining process, their negotiations are likely
to lead to an increase in output and thus an improvement in the well-
being of suppliers, consumers, and society.266 Accordingly, if suppliers
collude to confront a customer with substantial, persistent, durable, and
legally acquired monopsony power, their collusion is likely to be
procompetitive.
As a result, proof that a customer has monopsony power and that
this power satisfies the four prerequisites set forth above would suffice
to create the inference that collusion by the suppliers to counteract this
power would be procompetitive. In these circumstances, colluding sup-
pliers would have both the ability and the incentive to reach a bargain
with the customer that increased output.267
2. COUNTERVAILING POWER
If a customer’s power is countervailing power rather than monop-
sony power, the exercise of that power may be beneficial. When a cus-
263. This assumes that the collusion does not enable the suppliers to create downstream market
power. If it did, the defense would be unavailable.
264. The impact on downstream consumers is unlikely to be substantial if the monopsonist has
no downstream market power. But there is likely to be some adverse effect. The exercise of
monopsony power results in a reduction in the quantity of inputs purchased by the monopsonist,
and that normally lowers the quantity of output it produces. That lower output, in turn, will result
in some increase in downstream prices, so long as the market demand curve is downward sloping.
In other words, even if the monopsonist competes downstream with many other firms—and thus
has no individual market power—its exercise of monopsony power upstream is likely to reduce
the total quantity of output that reaches final consumers, putting some upward pressure on
downstream prices.
265. See supra part III.B and especially notes 135 & 147.
266. See supra part III.B and especially notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
267. Again, assuming the collusion does not generate downstream market power.
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tomer has countervailing power, its suppliers have market power by
definition and reducing that power will frequently be procompetitive,
leading to greater output and lower prices. In a number of circum-
stances, however, the exercise of countervailing power can be anticom-
petitive, producing higher prices downstream, diminished consumer
choice, reduced innovation, or other adverse effects.268 The issue is
when, if ever, to allow suppliers to collude to control such power.
In the e-books case, the greatest concern with Amazon’s exercise of
countervailing power was that it would harm innovation.269 By lowering
the revenues of publishers, and the incomes of authors who depended on
those revenues, Amazon’s countervailing power could reduce the incen-
tive of publishers and authors to create new books. In addition, as many
scholars have emphasized, innovation is the dimension of competition
that contributes the most to long-run consumer welfare, not only in the
production and sale of e-books but throughout the economy.270 Thus, if
collusion to offset countervailing power is ever to be allowed, it ought to
be when that power threatens the rate of innovation. At the same time,
given the frequent benefits of countervailing power, and the complexity
of determining when it is harmful,271 it is probably unwise, at least ini-
tially, to allow suppliers to collude to offset other undesirable effects of
countervailing power. Instead, the defense should be limited to cases in
which countervailing power has harmed innovation.
Determining that would be complicated enough. As the critics of
the e-books case made clear, a powerful customer may deprive suppliers
of the profits they need to make costly and risky investments in research
and development (“R&D”). But not every reduction in profits is harm-
ful. When a customer uses its leverage to force suppliers with market
power to lower their prices closer to the competitive level, it may simply
increase output and reduce downstream prices, without any adverse
impact on innovation. To determine when the exercise of countervailing
power has harmed innovation, rather than simply mitigated supracom-
268. See Kirkwood, supra note 27, at 1536–58 (describing and analyzing ten scenarios in
which the exercise of countervailing power by a buyer reduces competition, either downstream or
upstream, and harms consumers or small suppliers).
269. See supra Part IV.C.1.
270. See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW, ANTITRUST LAW ¶
407a, at 34 (3d ed. 2007) (“[T]echnological progress contributes significantly more to consumer
welfare than does the elimination of non-competitive prices.”); C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu,
Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182, 1211 (2013) (“New products and services drive
economic growth, and economic analysis suggests that technological change ultimately dominates
price effects in its long-run contribution to welfare. A remarkable consensus across a spectrum of
economic opinion takes dynamic harms and benefits as far more important than static ones.”)
(citing numerous sources).
271. See Kirkwood, supra note 27, at 1536–58 (discussing the issues presented by each of the
anticompetitive theories of countervailing power).
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petitive pricing, it is necessary to determine the level of profits needed to
induce research and development, an inquiry fraught with uncertainty
because it would entail an inquiry into the costs, risks, and rewards of
each type of R&D the suppliers might undertake. Since a thorough
attempt to resolve that issue would be protracted and complex, it is
undesirable to require it. Instead, it is better to adopt a simpler and more
concrete approach—an approach that turns on the past impact of coun-
tervailing power on innovation. Specifically, collusion to offset a cus-
tomer’s countervailing power should be allowed only when the suppliers
can demonstrate that this power had adversely affected their develop-
ment of better products or processes in the past. Put differently, unless
suppliers with market power can establish that their innovative output
fell as a result of the past exercise of countervailing power, they could
not collude to counteract it.272
Even this, however, would not be sufficient. A demonstrated past
impact on innovation would not be adequate to justify supplier collusion
because collusion itself can have an adverse effect on innovation. As
Professor Baker has explained, the state of competition in a market
affects the rate of innovation primarily by influencing two factors: (1)
the profits a firm can expect by innovating, and (2) the intensity of
rivalry in the market.273 Both motivate innovation. The former (expected
profits) provides a carrot, while the latter (the likelihood of losing mar-
ket share to firms that are more successful) furnishes a stick. Collusion
by suppliers would affect both factors: by curbing buyer power, it would
raise the expected profits of innovation, but, by reducing rivalry among
the firms, it would diminish the pressure to innovate. And that could be
a significant problem. The suppliers’ ultimate goal, after all, is to maxi-
mize their own profits, not serve consumers, and they may decide they
are more likely to maximize their profits if they spend less money trying
to take sales from each other through innovation.
Accordingly, suppliers should not be allowed to collude to offset a
customer’s countervailing power unless they can show not only that this
power had an adverse effect on their innovation in the past, but also that,
in the future and despite their collusion, the suppliers would still face
substantial pressure to innovate. In other words, suppliers must show
that, even though they are colluding, competition from other sources
would still supply a spur to innovate. How would they do that? One way
272. In the e-books case, for example, the publishers could have met this test if they had been
able to show that Amazon had demanded concessions that caused them to issue fewer new titles,
limit the diversity of those titles, abandon certain types of books, or slow the development of
improved e-readers.
273. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter v. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters
Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 587 (2007); see also Baker, supra note 103, at 561–62.
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would be to prove that the powerful customer competes downstream
with other firms that purchase inputs from different suppliers. Suppose
that suppliers A, B, and C face powerful customer K, and that K’s exer-
cise of countervailing power, by limiting the profits of A, B, and C, has
reduced their rate of innovation. Suppose also that K competes in the
downstream market with firms X, Y, and Z, who buy inputs from differ-
ent suppliers and who have an established track record of innovation. In
this setting, A, B, and C would still face substantial pressure to innovate,
despite their collusion, because, if they did not, they and their powerful
customer K could lose business to X, Y, and Z. In this circumstance, A,
B, and C might be able to justify their collusion. They would have to
show that the increase in profits they realized by colluding, coupled with
the continuing downstream pressure they felt to innovate, outweighed
the loss in rivalry among them. They might make this showing by prov-
ing that, in the past, their rate of innovation had been highly sensitive to
the profits they earned. By colluding, in other words, they restored the
profits that enabled them to innovate in the past, but, by colluding, they
did not eliminate the spur to innovate that other firms supplied.
The required showings are highly demanding and could not be met
except in unusual cases, if at all. But that is appropriate. When a cus-
tomer has countervailing power, its suppliers already have market power
and their ability to enlarge this power through collusion should not be
tolerated except in extraordinary cases. At the same time, however, if the
necessary circumstances are present and can be demonstrated—past
adverse effect on innovation, substantial remaining pressure to innovate,
innovation highly sensitive to profitability—collusion to counteract
countervailing power would be desirable. It would promote innovation
and benefit consumers.
C. No Downstream Market Power
The final element of the defense is the absence of downstream mar-
ket power. Suppliers should not be allowed to collude in response to a
customer’s power, no matter how large, if their collusion would enable
them to exercise downstream market power. For in that case, they would
acquire the ability and the incentive to exploit consumers.
The reason to allow suppliers to collude in the face of a powerful
buyer is that such collusion can correct a market failure—the existence
of anticompetitive buyer power—and improve both competition and
consumer welfare. To be sure, the collusion is itself an interference with
the market, but if the colluders’ incentives are aligned with those of
consumers, the outcome is likely to benefit consumers (as well as suppli-
ers) and promote downstream competition. But if the collusion creates a
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third market failure—downstream market power that did not already
exist—there is no longer any alignment of consumers’ and suppliers’
interests. To the contrary, the colluders would increase their profits by
exercising that downstream market power and harming consumers.274
Supplier collusion could create downstream market power that did
not already exist in three principal ways.275 First, the colluding suppliers
could raise prices beyond what is necessary to counteract the anticom-
petitive effects of the buyer’s power, raising the buyer’s input costs and
causing it to increase its downstream prices. Second, supplier collusion
could reduce competition downstream between the powerful customer
and its rivals. In the e-books case, for instance, the publishers imposed
the agency model on Amazon and other e-book retailers and then raised
retail prices. This created downstream market power because it elimi-
nated price competition between Amazon, the aggressive discounter, and
other retailers, by removing Amazon’s ability to set retail prices. The
publishers then exercised the resulting market power by using the
agency model—a form of resale price maintenance—to elevate retail
prices.
Third, supplier collusion could create downstream market power in
an unrelated market. Suppose that the suppliers sell their product in two
markets: in the first, they face a powerful customer; in the second, they
sell to customers that lack any significant power as buyers or sellers. In
the first, their collusion may create no downstream market power. In the
second, however, the suppliers may exert downstream power and raise
274. To see the transformative effect of downstream market power, imagine again that instead
of an input market consisting of a group of suppliers facing a powerful buyer, there is a single,
vertically integrated firm that produces the inputs and uses them to manufacture a final product.
As pointed out previously, if that firm had no downstream market power, it would maximize its
profits by producing at the point where its marginal cost equals the downstream market price—the
competitive outcome. See supra note 135. But if the firm had downstream market power, it would
maximize its profits by producing at a lower output and charging a higher price. Thus, if supplier
collusion creates downstream market power, that power changes the joint profit-maximizing
outcome and makes the ideal result for the suppliers and their customer—the result that would
give them the most profits to divide up—a supracompetitive price downstream.
275. Downstream market power may already exist when the suppliers begin to collude. If so,
the powerful customer would ordinarily be exercising that power, and collusion by the suppliers
would enable them to share in the profits. But it would not usually make consumers worse off, so
long as the customer was already exercising all the available downstream market power. The third
element of the defense, therefore, is designed to exclude cases in which supplier collusion would
create new downstream market power—power that is not already being exercised.
Even in cases of pre-existing downstream market power, consumers could be worse off if the
bargaining between the colluding suppliers and the customer misfires—if it not only fails to
increase output but actually results in reduced output. In that event, consumer prices would rise.
But as explained above, bilateral bargaining between colluding suppliers and a powerful customer
is likely to produce an increase in output, even if it does not achieve the joint profit maximizing
outcome, so long as no new downstream market power is created.
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prices to consumers. This assumes, of course, that the second market is a
relevant antitrust market, a market in which significant downstream
power could be exercised.276
In all three scenarios, the creation of downstream market power
allows colluding suppliers to enhance their profits by raising down-
stream prices. The suppliers benefit, of course, but allowing them to
benefit at the expense of consumers would not further the fundamental
objectives of antitrust law. As explained earlier,277 the paramount goal
of antitrust in a buy-side case is to protect powerless suppliers from the
exercise of unjustified monopsony power. This goal does not apply at all
to suppliers with market power facing a buyer with countervailing
power. As a result, in that setting, the overarching objective of antitrust
law is to benefit consumers, not suppliers. Moreover, when powerless
suppliers do face a buyer with monopsony power, protecting the suppli-
ers from exploitation would have value, but there is no evidence that
Congress wanted to allow such suppliers to raise their prices and profits
above the competitive level. Raising them up to the competitive level
would offset the monopsony power and, through a bargain between the
suppliers and the buyer that increased output, would ordinarily benefit
consumers. Raising them beyond that level would more than offset the
monopsony power and would normally cause output to fall and down-
stream prices to rise. In short, when supplier collusion creates down-
stream market power, allowing it would frustrate, not further, the
objectives of antitrust law.
To be sure, in the third scenario above, in which small suppliers
offset monopsony power in one market but exercise downstream market
power in another, there is a tradeoff between legitimate supplier benefit
in one market and consumer harm in another. But that tradeoff ought to
be resolved in favor of the consumers in the second market. Protecting
consumers from exploitation at the hands of price fixing sellers is the
most basic objective of all antitrust law.278 The Supreme Court has held,
moreover, that benefits in one market (the first) cannot justify anticom-
petitive harm in another (the second).279 In short, suppliers that collude
to offset buyer power should not be entitled to a defense if their collu-
276. That must also be true in the first and second scenarios. Supplier collusion cannot create
downstream market power unless it is possible and profitable to exercise such power.
277. See supra part III.C.
278. See Kirkwood, supra note 98, at 2426.
279. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370–71 (1963) (holding that a
merger that would create anticompetitive effects in one market cannot be justified by showing that
it would produce greater procompetitive effects in another market, for a merger whose effect “may
be substantially to lessen competition is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social
or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
While the Court’s pronouncement may not make much sense from an economic perspective, it
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sion creates downstream market power.280
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the intense criticism that accompanied its filing, the e-
books case was almost certainly warranted. The evidence strongly sug-
gests that Amazon was engaged in loss leading, not predatory pricing.
New entry into the e-books market, moreover, has diminished the likeli-
hood of an Amazon monopoly and curbed its buyer power. While its
countervailing power as a buyer is substantial—and cause for concern—
there was no evidence that it had resulted in a decline in the number,
variety, or quality of e-books. Instead, the exercise of Amazon’s buying
power appears to have brought lower prices to consumers. In contrast,
the publishers and Apple, by conspiring to impose the agency model on
Amazon and force up its prices, injured consumers directly and
substantially.
In the e-books case, in short, the Justice Department was right. But
that does not mean, as the existing per se rule implies, that collusion to
control a powerful customer is never warranted. When buyer power is
acquired and maintained legally—but harms consumers, powerless sup-
pliers, or both—there may be no other remedy. This article has
attempted to outline a limited but workable defense for such collusion.
Because the defense is so demanding, it would rarely be satisfied. But
when it is, it would allow suppliers to offset the harmful effects of buyer
power and enhance competition and the welfare of consumers.
does support the normative judgment that benefits to suppliers should not ordinarily outweigh
exploitation of consumers.
280. The defense could be further restricted by requiring suppliers to provide advance notice to
the federal antitrust agencies before engaging in collusion to offset customer power. Advance
notice is mandated for substantial mergers. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS 395 (7th ed. 2012) (“Parties to transactions that meet the statutory tests and
are not otherwise exempted by the H-S-R Act or its regulations must each file a notification and
report form and observe a waiting period prior to consummating the transaction.”) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 18a(a)). Advance notice is also required for export cartels. See id. at 1198 (“In order to
obtain the antitrust immunity provided by the Webb-Pomerene Act, associations must register
with the FTC and file annual reports.”) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 65; 16 C.F.R. § 1.42). Advance notice
is probably unnecessary, however, in the case of supplier collusion to offset buyer power. The
powerful buyer is likely to detect the collusion instantly when suppliers uniformly demand better
terms, enabling the buyer to alert the government and both to consider legal action.
